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RECENT CASES
Antitrust-Robinson-Patman-Adoption of Physical
Comparison Test To Determine "Like Grade
or Quality"
The Borden Company produced and sold evaporated milk under
its nationally advertised name and under private brand names owned
by certain customers. The private brand milk was physically and
chemically identical with the milk distributed under the Borden
name, but at both the wholesale and retail levels, it was sold at
prices consistently below those obtained for milk bearing the Borden
name. Competing private packers filed a complaint with the Federal
Trade Commission charging Borden with price discrimination in
violation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.' The Com-
mission found that since all the milk sold by Borden was "of like
brand and quality," section 2(a) was applicable, and held that the
price differential was discriminatory and adversely affected com-
merce.2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside the
Commission's cease and desist order on the ground that the Com-
mission failed to consider the commercial and economic importance
of consumer preference, which, when considered, classified the
products as not of the same grade and quality under the act.3 On
1. Clayton Act § 2(a), 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). The pertinent portion provides:
"[I]t shall be unlawful ... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality . ..where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers
of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery resulting
from the different methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered .. "
2. The hearing examiner found that Borden had discriminated in price but dismissed
the complaint on grounds that no injury to competition was present or likely, and
that the respondent had successfully shown cost justification. The FTC, in a 2-1
decision with two members not participating, reversed the examiner on both points,
and issued a cease and desist order. The proof of injury to competition consisted of
showing specific instances where competitors had lost accounts, or, in at least one
instance, had gone out of business as result of respondent's activities. Borden's cost
computations, in which it attempted to justify the price differentials, were likewise
rejected. The Commission affirmed the examiner's determination that the products
were of "like grade and quality." The Borden Co., TRADE BEG. REP. (1961-1963
Transfer Binder) 16191 (FTC) (Nov. 28, 1962).
3. Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (1964). The approach which incorporates
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certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. In
determining whether commodities are of like grade and quality
under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, a chemical and
physical comparison test is to be used, without regard to differences
in consumer preference for the products. Federal Trade Commission
v. The Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966).
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act forbids discrimination
by a seller in prices charged for "commodities of like grade and
quality" when such discrimination presents a real or potential injury
to competition in interstate commerce.4 Before issuing a charge, the
Commission must first determine if the goods whose prices are being
compared are of "like grade and quality," since section 2(a) is ap-
plicable only if this condition is satisfied. The legislative history
surrounding the "like grade and quality" provision does not clearly
indicate what was to be considered in interpreting that phrase,5 but
it is clear that differences in brand alone were not to be considered
a basis of differentiation. Federal Trade Commission decisions have
left little doubt that the Commission has always favored a physical
comparison test of like grade and quality.6 The test is seemingly
consumer preference is known as the market test approach. In subscribing to this
approach, the Court of Appeals rejected the physical comparison interpretation of the
Commission. The Appellate Court's reasoning was largely adopted by the Supreme
Court's dissenting opinion.
4. The Act provides two affirmative defenses, either of which justifies or excuses the
price differential. If the differential only reflects differences in costs of manufacture,
sale or delivery (the cost justification defense), or if the differential is due to the good
faith meeting of an equally low price of a competitor (the good faith meeting of
competition defense), it is not prohibited. See sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Act. 49
Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 13(b) (1958).
In the instant case Borden asserted the cost justification defense. It submitted data
showing price differential on private and premium brands of $1.09 per case, and
corresponding cost computations showing savings on the private brands in excess of
$1.09. The Commission rejected Borden's broad averaging approach, in view of indi-
vidual discriminations shown of up to $1.70 per case in some areas. The Supreme Court
apparently adopted this view as no mention of the defense was made in the opinion.
5. See notes 13 & 14 infra.
6. In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936), rev'd on other grounds,
101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939), the respondent was shown to be selling tires under the
Allstate brand to Sears, Roebuck & Co. at prices, after all quantity adjustments,
averaging eleven to twenty-two per cent below the tires sold to its own Goodyear
dealers under the All Weather brand. Both parties stipulated that the tires were
of "like grade and quality." Again, in United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489
(1939), the respondent was selling tires under private labels to favored customers at
prices below those charged its own dealers. Here again, the Commission's initial
determination that the commodities were of "like grade and quality" was not contested;
instead the respondent defended unsuccessfully on cost justification. In Whitaker
Cable Corp., 51 F.T.C. 58 (1955), an order was issued to respondent to stop
price discrimination in favor of private brand customers, after a determination of "like
grade and quality" had been made without objection. These cases are relied upon in
Borden for the proposition that brand, and presumably other commercial distinctions,
are not to be considered in determining "like grade and quality." The cases discussed
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simple: if the goods are chemically and physically alike, they are
within the provision.7 Nowhere in the cases considering section 2(a)
is there support for the proposition that brand preference, or any
other commercial factor, can be a basis for a finding of unlike grade
and quality. Yet, in none of these cases was the issue of commercial
distinctions actually raised and litigated; the question went by
default because the respondents relied upon the affirmative defenses
available to them rather than challenging the Commission's initial
determination of like grade and quality.
The alternative to the physical comparison test has been variously
termed the economic, commercial, or market test approach.8 Pro-
above are representative of the three other cases cited by the Court: Page Dairy Co.,
50 F.T.C. 395 (1953); United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950) (to avoid
confusion notice there are two United States Rubber Cases); Hansen Inoculator
Co., Inc., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938). For a discussion of how these cases would have
been decided under the market test approach, see Comment, Like Grade and Quality:
Emergence of the Commercial Standard. 26 Omo ST. L.J. 294, 320-21 (1965).
There are several more recent cases where "like grade and quality" was assumed
irrespective of the brand. The Commission, in the instant case, cited Hartley & Parker,
Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962), where respondent was
ordered to cease selling nationally advertised liquors at one price, and identical
liquor under different brands at lower prices. In American Metal Products Co., 60
F.T.C. 1667 (1962), bathtubs carrying the customers' own brands were found to be
of the same grade and quality as tubs bearing respondent's brand (later vacated for
mootness).
7. The physical comparison test is not without its pitfalls, however. See Bruce's Juices,
Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919
(5th Cir.), modified on rehearing, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951); Atlanta Trading
Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565 (1956); General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956); E.
Edelmann & Co., 51 F.T.C. 978 (1954); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 51 F.T.C. 282
(1954). These cases are discussed in Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentia-
tion: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1 (1956). In these
cases, the Commission was confronted with products of the same brand with minor
physical variations.
8. Even though no resourceful respondent had ever directly challenged the physical
comparison test prior to the instant case, it has not gone unchallenged among legal
writers. After a majority of the Attorney General's Committee To Study the Antitrust
Laws endorsed the physical comparison test in 1955, a number of articles appeared
which took issue. See Cassady & Grether, The Proper Interpretation of "Like Grade
and Quality" Within the Meaning of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 30
So. CAL. L. REv. 241 (1957); Rowe, supra note 7; Comment, 26 Osuo ST. L.J. 294
(1965). See also Jordan, Robinson-Patman Aspects of Dual Distribution By Brand
of Consumer Goods, 50 CORNL L.Q. 394, 404 (1965).
The majority of the Attorney General's Commission recommended "that the eco-
nomic factors inherent in brand names and national advertising should not be con-
sidered in the jurisdictional inquiry under the statutory 'like grade and quality' test.
. . . [T]he Commission majority feels that the abandonment of a physical test of
grade and quality in favor of a marketing comparison of intrinsically identical goods
might not only enmesh the administrators of the statute in complex economic in-
vestigations of every price discrimination charge, but also could encourage easy
evasion of the statute through artificial variations in the packaging, advertising, or
design of goods which the seller wishes to distribute at different prices .. " Air'Y GEN.




ponents of this view contend that in any appraisal of like grade and
quality, consumer preference must be recognized as a differentiating
factor. The commercial significance of any product is the price it will
command in the marketplace, and products with widely varying
consumer appeal are not, in any realistic sense, of "like grade and
quality."9 The market test approach does not differentiate on the basis
of brand as such, but rather on the relative consumer acceptance of
a given product. Thus, two established brands commanding sub-
stantially the same high price would not be differentiated under the
market test approach.'? Until the instant case, no respondent had
urged the market test approach before the Commission, and thus no
court had considered the validity of the physical test as the sole cri-
terion of 'like grade and quality.""
The Supreme Court's decision in the instant case is based upon
three considerations: (1) the interpretation placed upon "like grade
and quality" in earlier FTC cases; (2) the legislative history of the
act; and (3) the practical results which the Court felt would result
from using a market test approach. The majority devoted the greater
part of its opinion to congressional history to determine legislative
intent.12 The Court attached particular significance to the express
rejection of an amendment during the 1936 hearings which would
have limited the application of the section to commodities of like
"grade, quality and brand."'3 (Emphasis added.) Equally significant
to the Court was an exchange between Representatives Patman and
Taylor, in which Representative Taylor was assured that under the
bill like grade and quality would be considered "irrespective of the
brand." 4 The Court concluded that these events demonstrated a
congressional intent that brand (and by implication, any other com-
mercial factor) should not be considered in determining "like grade
and quality." Finally, the majority felt that the market test approach
9. It is contended, for example, that if consumers will pay $8.00 for brand A shirts,
while brand B can command only $5.50, then it is ignoring commercial realities to
base a finding of "like grade and quality" solely upon physical identity.
10. It is almost universally conceded that a rule permitting brand alone to differen-
tiate grade and quality would be a highly artificial approach which would limit the
effect of the Act. The market test approach is better appreciated after having seen
consumer habits surveys which reveal the importance of brand image to the average
consumer. See Cassady and Grether, supra note 8, at 259-62.
11. See Rowe, supra note 7, at 18.
12. The Court first cited six cases decided under section 2(a) dating back to
1936, but did not explain their significance. See note 6, supra.
13. "There was strong objection to the amendment and it was not adopted by the
Committee. The rejection of the amendment assumes particular significance since
it was pointed out in the hearings that the legality of price differentials between
proprietary and private brands was then pending before the Federal Trade Commission
in The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. at 641-42.
14. 80 CONG. REC. 8115 (1936).
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would enable sellers to circumvent the act by careful branding and
pricing policies which would generate differing degrees of apparent
"consumer preference."15 It declined to meet Borden's argument that
the Commission's view of like grade and quality for purposes of
section 2(a) cannot be squared with its rulings in cases under sec-
tion 2(b) where a seller presents a "good faith meeting of competition"
defense. 16 The Court saw no need to resolve this apparent conflict
since the 2(b) cases were not before the Court.
Justices Stewart and Harlan dissented on the grounds that there
is nothing in the act, its history, or prior FTC decisions which requires
reliance upon a physical test to the exclusion of other "commercially
significant distinctions." The minority found the "sparse" legislative
history in no way inconsistent with a grade and quality test which
included market acceptance. 17 The prior FTC precedents cited by the
majority were found equally unpersuasive, since the question of con-
sumer preference as a relevant factor in comparison of grade and
quality was never raised in the cases. The minority indicated that the
instant decision would reduce rather *than promote competition, 18
15. "The seller, to escape the Act, would have only to succeed in selling some
unspecified amount of each product to some unspecified portion of his consumer
customers . . . .The seller's pricing and branding policy, by being successful, would
apparently validate itself by creating a difference in 'grade' and thus taking itself
beyond the purview of the Act." Supra note 13, at 644-45.
16. Section 2(b) provides in part: ". . . nothing herein shall prevent a seller ...
[from] showing that his lower price ...was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor .... ." When manufacturers of premium products have
reduced their prices to the level of non-premium products, and have defended
at FTC action under the 2(b) "good faith meeting of competition" exception, the
Commission has consistently held that the premium seller was not meeting competition
but undercutting it, because the premium product would command a higher price.
In these cases the Commission has, in effect, recognized that a premium label makes
a product different; otherwise, the premium product could have been lawfully reduced
to the same price as the non-premium product. See Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923
(1953) ("public acceptance rather than the chemical analysis of the product is the
important competitive factor"). (Emphasis added.) See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
54 F.T.C. 277 (1957); Callaway Mills Co., ThADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer
Binder) ff 16,800 (1964); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948).
The dissenting justices viewed the inconsistency more seriously than did the majority
and thought it proper for the Court to resolve the conflict.
17. To the minority, the rejection of the "brand" amendment meant no more than
that mere differences in brand were insufficient to differentiate, and with that they
were not in disagreement. They found no authority which spoke with clarity on the
precise issue in the instant case, i.e., can physically identical products be differentiated
under § 2(a) by substantial market factors.
18. In analyzing the competitive effects of Borden's system, Mr. Justice Stewart
noted that Borden's own large private brand customers represented a significant
countervailing power to Borden itself and thus insured greater competition. Further-
more, the minority failed to see how competition on either the primary (competition
between competing sellers) or secondary (competition between competing buyers)




and would encourage price uniformity conflicting with the broad anti-
trust policies of the government.' 9
Because neither the statute nor its legislative history is conclusive
on the point, most discussion of the proper approach concerns the
anticipated results which would flow from the application of each
approach. Proponents of the physical comparison test express the fear
that recognition of brands or other commercial factors in differentiat-
ing products under 2(a) will "emasculate" the act by providing an
easy means of circumvention.20 Arguments advanced for a market
preference test emphasize that the "laboratory analysis" approach used
in the instant case is a rigid standard unattuned to market realities,
which will impede broad antitrust objectives by reducing rather than
promoting competition.21 If a well-known premium product and an
unknown brand of, the same physically identical product are brought
within 2(a) under the physical comparison test, the seller may be
forced into one of three general choices: (1) equalize prices at the
private brand price level; (2) equalize prices at the premium brand
level; or (3) forego private brand sales entirely. Alternative (1) is
unlikely to be acceptable economically. Alternative (2) will normally
result in the occurrence of (3), because of private brand price compe-
tition. Thus, the end result of a strict application of the physical
comparison test may well be the exclusion of the premium brand
producers from the private brand market.22 The potential impact of
19. The Supreme Court in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953),
said that the Act should be interpreted and applied consistently with "the broader
antitrust policies that have been laid down by Congress" and so to avoid "a price
uniformity and rigidity in open conflict with the purposes of other anti-trust legislation."
20. For a rebuttal to the "emasculation" argument, see Cassady & Grether,
supra note 8, at 272; Comment, 26 Osno ST. L.J. 294, at 316.
21. The Robinson-Patman Act has the same ultimate end as the other antitrust law
from which it stems: promotion of a climate of healthy marketplace competition. Yet
the Robinson-Patman Act seems too concerned with, to put it simply, competition
found undesirable for reasons as much social as economic-thus the danger that the
Act may be applied in a manner counter to overall antitrust policy. See note 19
supra. See also Comment, 26 OHio ST. L.J. 294 (1965).
For interesting examples of some of the anti-chain store bombast which accompanied
the passage of the Act, see Rowe, supra note 7, at 3.
22. At first impression, such a result seems to follow from the instant decision, where
Borden is prohibited from unjustifiably discriminating in price between its premium
and nonpremium brands. By Borden's own computations, the price differentials
averaged $1.09 per case. It is unlikely that Borden can raise wholesale prices even
one dollar per case and still remain competitive with private brand packers who
aren't hampered by distributing a premium brand in addition to their private brands.
On the other hand, Borden will be reluctant to reduce its prices on the Borden brand,
which constitutes the bulk of its volume. However, Borden is required to equalize
prices only to the extent of the differential which is not justified by cost savings. Dif-
ferentials due to bona fide cost savings are not proscribed. Judging from the re-
spondent's cost analysis table set out in the Commission's record, supra note 2, at
21,024, and the Commission's discussion of disallowable cost items at page 21,025,
Borden apparently successfully justified a cost savings of approximately one dollar
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the decision upon marketing in general appears almost unlimited be-
cause of the extent to which dual multi-brand distribution is prevalent
in the economy. The practice of selling a heavily advertised premium
product at a premium price while at the same time supplying large
private brand customers at lower prices has become so embedded in
American marketing that a sudden, strict application of the decision
would be seriously disruptive. However, the fact that the Commission
has waited so long to move against what is unquestionably a wide-
spread business practice suggests that the Commission may not be
prepared to go as far as logical extension of the physical comparison
test might carry it. As in many landmark decisions, the instant case
is seemingly very broad in its implications and must await further
clarification. The Commission probably will not adopt an expansive
construction of Borden in dealing with the problem. Earlier periods
of Commission practice suggest that "like grade and quality" standards
have not been without some flexibility, and it is submitted that a
stricter application of existing standards as to what constitutes "like
grade and quality," along with a more liberal construction of cost
justification defenses, may dilute the impact of the decision on
marketing generally. 3 Any meaningful evaluation of the net effect
of the application of the physical comparison test must await further
developments. 24
per case on the nonpremium brand. Thus the Commission would have permitted, and
presumably will permit in the future, Borden to continue this cost justified difference.
Therefore, the position of premium producers in the private brand market isn't as
bleak as it appears at first impression. The point to remember is that the Act only
requires equalization of prices to the extent that the difference is not justified by cost.
See note 23 infra, for discussion of another critical matter, i.e., what costs can be
included in the cost justification computation.
23. In summary, three provisions of the Act suggest themselves as possible escapes,
or at least as mitigating the impact of the instant decision. They are discussed in
Cassady & Grether, supra note 8, at 273.
(1) Cost justification. This subject was explored in the preceding footnote. The
cost factors which may be included in raising the defense have been largely settled
by case law. See supra note 2, at f[ 21,025. But a remaining question is whether the
Commission will permit the inclusion of advertising expense as a cost factor for the
premium brand. If advertising and promotion are to be included, the impact of the
instant decision would be diluted substantially. Borden did not include promotion
of the Borden name in its cost computations, perhaps because it thought it had
successfully justified the difference without it.
(2) Good faith meeting of competition. If Borden could have shown that the
private brand prices were no more than a good faith meeting of already established
prices for comparable goods, that defense would have been sufficient.
(3) No injury to competition. An initial determination of injury to commerce is
necessary before the Act is operative. However, the Commission's readiness to impute
potential injury to commerce, and its rejection of commercial distinctions for purposes
of Section 2(a) make this defense unpromising.
24. See the analysis of the Commission's application of the "like grade and quality"
provision over the years in Rowe, supra note 7, at 9-12.
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Antitrust-Tying Arrangement Held Unfair Method
of Competition Under Section 5 of Federal
Trade Commission Act
Atlantic Refining Company agreed to promote to its dealers the
tires, batteries, and accessories (TBA) of the Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company;' in exchange, Goodyear agreed to pay Atlantic a
commission on the Atlantic dealers' sales of TBA.2 The Federal Trade
Commission's hearing examiner found that Atlantic had used coercive
tactics in promoting the Goodyear TBA products to its dealers and
ordered it to cease-and-desist.3 The Federal Trade Commission
affirmed this order but found, that even absent Atlantic's coercive
tactics, the agreement, standing alone, was a "classic example" of
illegal use of economic power in one market (gasoline distribtuion) to
destroy competition in another market (TBA distribution) .4 As such,
the agreement was an unfair method of competition in violation of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.5 The Commission
ordered Atlantic and Goodyear to cease further participation in the
agreement.6 The Seventh Circuit affirmed.7 On certiorari from the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed. The Federal
Trade Commission could reasonably find that the agreement was in
effect a tying arrangement and was an unfair method of competition
prohibited by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Atlantic
Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides that "unfair
1. The agreement is termed a sales-commission plan.
2. 7.5% on sales by Atlantic wholesalers; 10% on sales by Atlantic retailers. Atlantic
had a similar agreement with the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company. Though Fire-
stone was not joined as respondent, the Commission's final order prohibited Atlantic
from implementing similar agreements with Goodyear or "with any other rubber com-
pany .. . or with any other supplier" of TBA. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58
F.T.C. 309, 369 (1961).
3. The hearing examiner found that Atlantic coerced its dealers by demands that
the dealers discontinue purchasing tires, batteries and accessories from manufacturers
other than Goodyear under threat of lease cancellation or non-renewal. Id. at 321-23.
Goodyear had similar agreements with numerous oil companies. For a list, see id. at
323 n.1. The Commission's final order also prohibited Goodyear from implementing
these agreements, though the other oil companies were not joined as respondents. Id
at 323, 370.
4. "[W]e regard these overt acts of coercion as mere symptoms of a more funda-
mental restraint of trade inherent in the sales commission itself." Id. at 348.
5. Id. at 325.
6. Id. at 369-70.
7. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964); 63 Micmi
L. REv. 713 (1965). In a similar case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed the Commission. Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (DC Cir.
1964), vacated and remanded per curiam, 381 U.S. 739 (1965).
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methods of competition in commerce . ..are .. .unlawfur' 8 and
empowers the Federal Trade Commission to prevent unfair methods of
competition.9 The statute's language is purposely broad. Congress
apparently intended to reach not only trade practices condemned
by prior antitrust legislation but also anticompetitive methods which
businessmen might use to avoid the force of those prior laws.'0
Initially the courts assumed ultimate power to define the words"unfair methods of competition."" In the first section 5 case to come
before it, the United States Supreme Court held that section 5 pro-
hibited "restrictive," as well as "unfair," practices.12  "Restrictive"
was defined as having a "dangerous tendency unduly to hinder compe-
tition or create monopoly." 3 It thus followed that section 5 would
reach actions violating both the Sherman and Clayton Acts.'4 In
dictum, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that section 5 could
condemn tying arrangements 5 which are unlawful under either of
those acts.' 6 Until the instant case, however, the only successful
attacks on tying arrangements have been those under section 1 of the
Sherman Act 7 and section 3 of the Clayton Act.' 8 The Supreme Court
has also indicated in dicta that "unfair methods of competition" may
8. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
9. Section 5(a)(6) provides: "The Commission is empowered and directed to
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of
competition in commerce and unfair . .. acts or practices in commerce." 66 Stat.
632 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1964).
10. "The committee gave careful consideration to the question whether it would
attempt to define the many . .. unfair practices which prevail in commerce . . .
[or] whether it would ... [make] a general declaration. . . . It concluded that the
latter course would be the better, for the reason . ..that .. .after writing 20 of
them into law it would be quite possible to invent others." S. REP. No. 597, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914).
11. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920). See Handler, Recent Antitrust
Developments, 71 YALE L.J. 75, 94 n.113 (1961).
12. FTC v. Gratz, supra note 11, at 427; Handler, supra note 11, at 94.
13. FTC v. Gratz, supra note 11, at 427. "Unfair" was held to mean "opposed to
good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud, or oppression." Ibid.
14. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 689-93 (1948) (Sherman Act); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1941) (Clayton
Act).
15. The term "Tying arrangement" describes the situation where a seller or lessor
makes the purchase or lease of one product (the tied product) a prerequisite to the
purchase or lease of another product -(the tying product).
16. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 (1953):
"In either case, the [tying] arrangement transgresses § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, since minimally that section registers violations of the Clayton and
Sherman Acts."
17. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), International Busi-
ness Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
18. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), United Shoe Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
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include "incipient" violations of the Sherman Act.19 Likewise, section
5 might reach conduct resembling a Sherman Act violation even
though all the elements of such a violation are not present.20 Since
the instant decision relies on Sherman Act precedents, it can only be
understood in light of the Sherman Act treatment of tying arrange-
ments.2'
In the earliest cases applying the Sherman Act to trade practices
generally, the rule evolved that only those restraints which were"unreasonable" were prohibited.22 Thus the courts had to balance the
extent of the restraint against justifications for the particular trade
practice to determine whether the trade practice imposed an un-
reasonable restraint on competition.23 The early application of the
Sherman Act to tying arrangements followed the same approach. 24
Later tying arrangement cases, however, introduced a new rule: a
tying arrangement is an unreasonable restraint of trade per se
whenever the defendant seller has a "monopolistic position" in the
market for the tying product and the arrangement involves a sub-
stantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied product.25 With
limited exceptions 6 this per se approach dispensed with the need
to weigh the extent of the restraint or the business justifications for
it. Nevertheless, courts still had to analyze the tying product market
in order to determine whether the seller held a monopolistic position
in that market.27 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States28 substantially
19. See Howery, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Comm is-
sion Act as an Antitrust Law, 5 ANTIRUsT BuLL. 161, 170-73 (1960).
20. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953);
FTC v. Cement Institute, supra note 14, at 721 n.4; Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 14, at 463.
21. In the instant case, the Federal Trade Commission relied on cases which were
decided on the basis of Sherman Act rules; a discussion of the Clayton Act rules on
tying arrangements is considered outside the scope of this paper. Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, supra note 17, restated the Clayton rule. The
Clayton and Sherman rules are now approximately the same. Turner, The Validity
of the Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HAv. L. Rrv. 50, 59
(1958).
22. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 66 (1911).
23. HzmnunsoN, FEDRAL TRAE Commiss o, 14-15 (1924).
24. Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
25. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) appears to be
the origin of this rule.
26. International Salt indicated that an exception might exist where, in order to
protect the integrity of its machinery, a seller ties to the sale of his machinery a
product to be used with the machinery. However, this exception did not apply
where a product of suitable quality was readily available elsewhere. 332 U.S. at
398. Another case indicates that an exception may be made where the tie-in is used
by a new business with a highly uncertain future. United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp. 187 F. Supp. 545, 555-57 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1960).
27. To gain an appreciation of how intricate such an analysis could be, see the
opinion in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, supra note 16, at 610-21.
28. 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Turner, supra note 21, at 50.
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relaxed this burden. The Supreme Court there abandoned the re-
quirement that the seller have a "dominant" or "monopolistic" posi-
tion in the market for the tying product; henceforth the seller need
merely have "sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable
restraint on free competition in the market for the tied product."29
The Court held that "sufficient economic power" could be inferred,
in the absence of some other explanation, from the existence of a large
number of tying arrangements. 30 No substantial modifications of the
Sherman Act approach to tying arrangements have followed Northern
Pacific.
31
In Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co.,32 the Sherman Act was applied to
a situation similar to that in the instant case. Relying on Northern
Pacific Ry., a Sinclair retail dealer attacked Sinclair's promotion of
Goodyear TBA as a tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman
Act. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that Sinclair
had used coercive tactics to promote the Goodyear TBA, and held
that the agreement to promote, coupled with Sinclair's coercive
conduct, amounted to an agreement to tie TBA to the retail sale of
gasoline and was an unreasonable restraint of trade per se.33
In the instant case, the Court recognized that there was no express
requirement that Atlantic dealers take the Goodyear TBA.3 The
Court also observed that Atlantic was not contending for a right to use
coercive tactics in promoting the Goodyear TBA.35 Hence there
could be no tying arrangement either expressed in the agreement
as in Northern Pacific Ry., or implied from a course of coercive conduct
as in Osborn. On the other hand, the Court noted that Atlantic pos-
sessed great power over its dealers.-1 Due to this power,3 7 Atlantic's
29. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 28, at 6.
30. Id. at 8.
31. At least one writer felt that the Court had already extended the per se rule
too far. Oppenheim, Developments in the Courts and the Federal Trade Commission,
15 ABA ANTITRsT SEc. REP. 39-41 (1959).
32. 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960).
33. Id. at 836.
34. 381 U.S. 369 (1965). Mr. Justice Clark wrote the opinion in this five-to-three
decision. Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented on the ground
that the anticompetitive effects could be cured simply by prohibiting Atlantic's use
of coercive tactics in the promotion of TBA. Mr. justice Goldberg, in a separate
dissenting opinion did not necessarily disagree in principle with the majority but felt
that the Court should remand the case to the Commission for clarification of the
Commision's opinion and order.
35. Id. at 367.
36. Id. at 368. The Court cited four sources of power: (1) short-term lease con-
tracts, (2) short-term equipment loan contracts, (3) control of the supply of gaso-
line and oil, and (4) control of advertising. One might take issue with the realities
of this power. See Distribution Practices in the Petroleum Industry, Hearing Before
Subcommittee Number 5 of the House Select Committee on Small Business, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 205-11 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 1957 Hearings].
37. It should be said that the Court is ambiguous on this point. At one point the
1966]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
agreement to promote Goodyear TBA was equivalent to an agree-
ment requiring the purchase of TBA by its retailers as a condition
precedent to retention of their dealership, i.e., a tying arrangement.38
The inability to fit this situation into the traditional tying arrangement
mold did not disturb the Court, for section 5 was held broad enough to
reach conduct bearing "the characteristics" of antitrust violations.39
Having found conduct which resembled a tying arrangement, the
Court went on to apply the Sherman Act test for determining whether
the tying arrangement was illegal per se. Defining the tying product
as the distribution of gasoline and the tied product as the distribution
of TBA, the Court found that Atlantic's dominant position over its
dealers gave it sufficient economic power in the distribution of gasoline
to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the distribu-
tion of TBA.40 Moreover, the dollar volume of Goodyear sales indi-
cated that the arrangement affected a substantial portion of interstate
commerce.41 Since these two elements of a Sherman Act violation
were established, further analysis of the competitive effects of the
arrangement was unnecessary.42 Likewise it was unnecessary to
weigh business justifications.
Nor can we say that the Commission erred in refusing to consider evi-
dence of economic justification. . . . The anticompetitive effects of this
program are clear on the record and render unnecessary extensive economic
analysis of market percentages or business justifications .... 43
The agreement, an effective tying arrangement, was unreasonable
per se within the meaning of the Sherman Act and thus was an
unfair method of competition in violation of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
44
Court says, "The long existence of the plan, coupled with coercive acts . . . warranted
.... " the decision to prohibit the agreement altogether. Id. at 372. At another point
the Court says, "it is the oil companies' power and overt acts . . . that outlaw the
commission plan .... Id. at 373. (Emphasis added.)
38. 381 U.S. 370.
39. Id. at 369-70. In so saying, the Court relied on dicta of earlier opinions. See
note 19 supra and accompanying text.
40. Id. at 368.
41. Id. at 370.
42. Id. at 370-71. Again the Court was ambiguous. At one point the Court said,
"just as the effect of this plan is similar to that of a tie-in, so it is unnecessary to
embark upon a full-scale analysis of competitive effect. We think it enough that
the Commission found that a not insubstantial amount of commerce is affected." Id.
at 371. At another point the Court noted with approval that, having rejected a
"mechanical application" of the tying arrangement rules, the Commission had made
an analysis of anticompetitive effects. Id. at 370. A reader could conclude that in
a similar case in the future the Commission would not have to make an analysis of
anticompetitive effects. He could also conclude the opposite.
43. Ibid.
44. Although the Court does not use the words "per se" in its opinion, the Court
seemed to take the per se approach. But see note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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The decision may be limited to the particular factual situation pre-
sented. The Court relied heavily upon the power held by the oil-
product manufacturer over his retail dealers by virtue of short-term
leases, 45 and this situation is virtually unique to the oil industry.46 In
fact, the Court indicated that even in the oil industry generally, the
manufacturer's power over his retailers may be insufficient to render
a similar sales-commission plan unlawful.47 Thus limited, the de-
cision is probably correct, since the arrangement between Atlantic and
Goodyear did suppress competition in TBA. By dealing directly with
Goodyear or some other TBA supplier, the Atlantic dealers would
obtain the benefit of competition in TBA. Direct dealing with the
TBA distributors would not prevent the Atlantic dealers from ob-
taining the other advantages of the sales-commission plan.48
The decision might have broader implications, however, which
subject it to possible criticism. Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent suggests
one criticism. It is possible to construe the Court's decision as a con-
demnation of a manufacturer's promotion of a complementary line of
products wherever the manufacturer has substantial power over his
retailers. If this reading is correct, the Court was ignoring consider-
able authority which allows a manufacturer to force his retailers to
carry his full line of products. 49 One might argue for a distinction
based upon the difference in the manufacturer's proprietary interests
in the two situations; in one situation the manufacturer produces the
complementary product himself, while in the other he merely promotes
the products of another manufacturer. However, if in the latter
situation the promoting manufacturer receives a commission, this
distinction becomes tenuous. Thus the instant case leaves uncertain
the continued validity of a long line of cases authorizing a significant
business practice.50
The decision is also subject to criticism on the ground that the
Court should have considered possible business purposes for the ar-
rangement rather than adopting the per se approach. The justification
for applying a rule of per se illegality to tying arrangements was
45. Note that the opinion is not altogether clear on this point. See note 37 supra.
Compare Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
46. The degree to which these problems are unique can be seen by a reading of
1957 Hearings.
47. "This order does not necessarily prohibit Goodyear from making contracts with
companies not possessed of economic power over their dealers." 381 U.S. at 376-77.
48. Thd alleged advantages to the retail dealer are the manufacturer's assistance by
advertising, training, maintaining an adequate current inventory, and offering credit
services. Those to the consumer are more efficient services. 1957 Hearings 213.
49. United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
50. Indeed, the full-line forcing issue may soon be relitigated on the tying arrange-
ment theory. See Hammond Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., Trade Reg. Rep. 71689
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1966).
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found in the long line of cases analyzing typical tie-in situations and
finding that they serve no purpose "but the suppression of competi-
tion."51 The Court considered that repeated analysis of the competitive
effects and business purposes of such an arrangement was a waste of
time. The per se rule eliminates the need for such analysis.52 Though
this approach seems valid when the Court is considering a typical
tying arrangement, such an arrangement was not under consideration
in the instant case. But the majority assimilated the agreement to
a tying arrangement because Atlantic's power over its retailers seemed
to render its promotion of TBA equivalent to a requirement that the
dealers take the TBA as a condition for continuing the lease.53 In
a situation which does not fit squarely within the traditional tying
arrangement mold, the Court's justification for using the rule of per
se illegality may not be valid since there may well be proper business
purposes for the arrangement54 For example, in the instant case it
might be argued that Atlantic does have a purpose in the sales-
commission arrangement beyond the mere suppression of competi-
tion. Since Atlantic invests capital in its retail stations and sells its
products through these stations, certainly it may properly attempt
to maximize the return on this investment. Likewise, efforts to protect
the reputation of its oil products by insuring the quality of the TBA
products sold simultaneously seem legitimate. In unique situations,
such as presented here, a court should analyze actual competitive
effects, weigh the relevant business purposes, and determine whether
the restraint on competition is, in fact, unreasonable. 55 A court should
not avoid this analysis by drawing a simple conceptual analogy to a
situation covered by a per se rule of illegality.
51. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 28, at 6; Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
52. Turner, supra note 21, at 59.
53. Note, again that the opinion is not altogether clear. See note 37 supra.
54. Indeed, there is some doubt that this justification is valid in a typical tying ar-
rangement case. Baldwin & McFarland, Some Observations on "Per Se" and Tying Ar-
rangements, 6 ANTUST BuLL. 433 (1961); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the
Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Turner, supra note 21, at 50.
55. It is interesting to note here some legislative history. In 1957, H.R. 428 was
introduced in Congress, H.R. 428, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). This bill sought to
prohibit the sales-commission plan or any similar plan under which the oil-products
manufacturer would receive payment for a sale of TBA to his retail dealers. Of that
bill John Gynne, then chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, said: "it seems
to me the propriety of such actions can best be determined in the context in which
they take place. By this I mean it is possible that the actions . . . could have no




Bankruptcy-Tax-Rights of a Trustee in Bankruptcy
Against an Unrecorded Tax Lien
The Internal Revenue Service sought to enforce an unrecorded tax
lien against a trustee in bankruptcy. The tax had been assessed and
demand for payment made. Refusal to pay gave rise to a federal tax
lien under section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,1
but prior to the recording of the lien the taxpayer filed a petition in
bankruptcy. The trustee in bankruptcy contended that section 70c of
the Bankruptcy Act vested him with the rights of a "judgment
creditor"2 and, therefore, the lien was unenforceable under section
6323 of the Internal Revenue Code which invalidates unrecorded tax
liens against "judgment creditors."3 The government contended that
section 6323 "judgment creditors" did not include trustees in bank-
ruptcy. A decision by the referee in bankruptcy in favor of the trustee
was affirmed by both the district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.4 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. A federal tax lien unrecorded at the time of bankruptcy
is invalid as against the trustee in bankruptcy. United States v. Speers,
382 U.S. 266 (1965).
The traditional aim of American bankruptcy acts5 has been "to
marshal the bankrupt's assets; and to distribute them among his
creditors equitably."6 To promote this aim, statutes have attempted
to protect the trustee's distributions against subsequent attack by
secret lien holders by vesting him with title in the bankrupt's property
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321 provides: "If any person liable to pay any tax
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in
favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to such person."
2. Section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act provides in part: "The trustee, as to all
property, whether or not coming into possession or control of the court, upon which
a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of such date with
all the rights, remedies and powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by
such proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually exits."
3. Section 6323 of the INT. REv. CoDE provides in part: "[T]he lien imposed by
section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or
judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the secretary or his dele-
gates .... "
4. United States v. Speers, 335 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1964).
5. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 made bankruptcy legislation a permanent part of
American jurisprudence, and it is upon the act that the present Act of 1938, known
as the Chandler Act, is largely based. 1 CoLTm, BANKRUPTCY ff 0.001, at 3 (14th
ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as ComLrs].
6. H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949). Seligson, Preferences Under
the Bankruptcy Act, 15 VAND. L. REv. 115 (1961).
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superior to unrecorded liens.7 The first of these statutes8 was inter-
preted, in 1906, to vest trustees with superior title only where creditors
existed who were similarly protected against the unrecorded lienors
by state law.9 Otherwise the trustee could not intercede to prevent
perfection of secret liens and prevent this threat to creditors having
taken, or hoping to take, under the trustee's distributions. Dissatisfied
with this limitation, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in 1910,
to grant trustees in bankruptcy the status of a creditor holding a lien
by legal or equitable proceedings with regard to property coming
into the custody of the bankruptcy court, and the status of a judgment
creditor holding an unsatisfied execution as to all other property.10
This provision with no material change in wording became the
present section 70c by the Bankruptcy Act of 1938.11
Contrasted with the congressional disfavor toward unrecorded
liens has been congressional favor granted federal revenue claims.
Federal revenue obligations have been protected by liens upon the
property of the delinquent taxpayer12 and granted first priority
over competing claims in liquidation proceedings.13 Congress limited
7. MacLachlan, The Title and Rights of the Trustee in Bankruptcy, 14 RuTGErms L.
REv. 653, 667 (1960).
8. See § 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as discussed in 4 CoLLt ff 70.48,
at 1400.
9. York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U.S. 344 (1906). Except where creditors were
specifically protected by state law against unrecorded liens which existed as to the
bankrupt, the trustee obtained no better title to the property than would have existed
in the bankrupt party. "Since under the laws of many states, unrecorded mortgages,
pledges, conditional sales and the like as well as many other types of secret transactions
dangerous to creditors, are not invalid except as to creditors who have levied upon
or have fastened a lien on the property in dispute, the York case sharply limited
the usefulness of the provisions of § 70a(5) .... ." 4 COLLRT f1 70.48, at 1401.
10. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 47a(2), 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 36 Stat.
838 (1910), 11 U.S.C. § 75 (1964), states in part: "[T]rustees, as to all property
in the custody ... of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested with all the rights,
remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a lien by equitable or legal proceeding
thereon; and also as to all property not in custody of the bankruptcy court, shall
be deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor
holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied." Note that the trustee is given a
less advantageous status with regard to property without the custody of the bank-
ruptcy court, i.e., that of a "judgment creditor," than be is given with regard to property
within the custody of the court, i.e., that of a creditor holding a lien by legal or
equitable proceedings. Morris, Avoiding Federal Tax Liens in Bankruptcy, 39 TEXAs
L. REv. 616, 618 (1961); 4 CorLma II 70.47, at 1393 n.18; Id. if 70.49, at 1413 n.3a.
11. For an explanation of the shift of this provision from § 47(a)2 to § 70c,
see id. if 70.47, at 1391.
12. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 3670, 53 Stat. 448 (1939); Loiseaux, Federal
Tax Liens in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 137 (1961).
13. "The government has bad, since 1789, a statutory priority which provides,
in essence, that in any case of insolvency the debts due the United States shall be
satisfied first [1 Stat. 42, § 21 (1789), codified in Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875), 31
U.S.C. § 191]. This statute has always been construed liberally in favor of the
government, and in 1929, the Supreme Court embarked upon greater expansion of
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this protection in 1913 by enacting section 3672 of the Internal
Revenue Code (the predecessor of the present section 6323), which
invalidated unrecorded tax liens against "judgment creditors."14
Prior to 1950, section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act had been in-
terpreted as granting trustees the status of "judgment creditor" for
purposes of various statutes benefiting such creditors.'5 Only one
case, however, United States v. Sands, 6 purported to pass on a
trustee's rights under section 367217 of the Code. The court there
stated that section 70c made the trustee a "judgment creditor" within
the protection of section 3672. In 1950, however, section 70c was
amended to give trustees the position of a creditor holding a judicial
lien on all the bankrupt's property.18 Thus, the previous distinction
between property held within and without the bankruptcy court
was eliminated and any express reference to "judgment creditors"
was deleted. The legislative history of the 1950 amendment to
section 70c clearly indicates that the amendment was in no way
intended to restrict the benefits or rights previously extended to
trustees under that section.'9 Nevertheless, many courts subsequently
the priority by announcing the inchoate lien doctrine. By reading the priority statute
in pari materia with the lien provision of the Internal Revenue Code, the Court has
concluded that only a prior lien which is choate should prevail over the federal
tax lien. . . . [W]hen the trustee is deprived of his status as a judgment creditor
under section 6323 of the Code, his chances against the federal tax lien are meagre
indeed." Note, 35 IND. L.J. 351, 356-57 (1960). MACLACHLAN, BANRMUPTcY § 18
(1956); 1 CooGA_, HocAN & VACTS, SEcunED TANSAcIONS UNDER U.C.C. 1 12.03,
at 1256 (1963) (for a discussion of the inchoate lien doctrine).
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 3672, 53 Stat. 449 (1939). Section 3672
became § 6323 in the INT. BEv. CODE OF 1954. See note 3 supra for text of the
statute.
15. See In re Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776, 782-85 (3d Cir.) (Kalodner
and Hastie, J.J. dissenting), cert. denied sub. nom. Borough at East Newark v. United
States, 364 U.S. 828 (1960).
16. 174 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1949). The court expressly rejected the contention of
the government based on the "dictum of In re Taylororaft Aviation Corp. . . . that
'an unrecorded tax lien of the collector was good against a trustee because a trustee
was not a judgment creditor."' Id. at 385. However, the court held for the govern-
ment on other grounds.
17. Note that § 3672 was re-enacted without change as § 6323 in the 1954 Code.
Though it is necessary to refer to the sections separately, they may be treated as
synonymous for all purposes.
18. See note 2 supra for the text of the statute.
19. Congress felt that this amendment was a necessary corollary to an amendment
of § 60a of the same act which caused the four-month statute of limitations on
the voidability of preferential transfers to begin as of the time those transfers
"became so far perfected that no subsequent lien ...obtainable by legal or equitable
proceedings . . . could become superior to the rights of the transferee." See 3
COLLUER f 60.38, at 946, for an explanation of the change in § 60a. The relationship
of this amendment to the amendment to 70c was stated by the report of the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Representatives, H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
4 (1949): "In view of the amendment made to section 60a as well as intrinsically, it
is deemed wise to place the trustee in bankruptcy in the position of a lien creditor with
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held that the 1950 deletion of the term "judgment creditor" from
section 70c excluded trustees from the protection extended such
creditors under section 6323 of the Code.20 Alternatively it was
argued that section 6323 itself excluded trustees from its coverage of"judgment creditors." This argument was initiated by the 1953
Supreme Court case of United States v. Gilbert Associates,2 1 a case
arising out of a state insolvency proceeding. The state court had
classified the local tax claim as "in the nature of a judgment," and
had found that the unrecorded federal tax lien was therefore invalid
as against the municipal tax assessment under section 3672 of the
Code.z2 To avoid making the rights of section 3672 "judgment
creditors" subject to the diverse state definitions of "judgment credi-
tors," the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the term "judgment
creditor" for purposes of section 3672 was meant to be applied "in
the usual, conventional sense of a judgment of the court of record."2
3
Subsequent decisions in the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits held
that the Supreme Court's definition of a section 3672 "judgment
creditor" was binding and excluded trustees in bankruptcy from its
protection.2 To resolve the conflict between these decisions and the
immediate decision of the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the instant case.25
The Supreme Court examined the legislative histories of sections
70c and 6323 and found, in both instances, a congressional intent
respect to all of the bankrupty's property, and section 2 of the bill so amends section
70c."
"That Congress intended to give the trustee the status of a 'judgment creditor'
[in the 1950 amendment to § 70c] is perfectly plain." Seligson, Creditors' Rights,
32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 708, 710 (1957). 4 CoLLI U 70.47, at 1399; H.R. REP'. No. 1293,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949); Morris, supra note 10, at 618; Loiseaux, supra note
12, at 139.
Section 70c was again amended in 1952 with the aim being clarity of expression
rather than a change in substance. "What should be said is that . . . the trustee has
the rights of a lien creditor upon property in which the bankrupt has an interest
or as to which the bankrupt may be the ostensible owner." H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1952). No change in content was made with regard to the
trustee's rights under § 6323. For further explanation, see 4 CoLLM U 70.47, at
1396.
20. "The cases [following this reasoning] are collected . . . in an annotation, 2
L. Ed. 2d 1823, 1867 (1958)." MacLachlan, supra note 7, at 667 n.66; In re Fidelity
Tube Corp., supra note 15.
21. 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
22. Petition of Gilbert Associates, Inc., 97 N.H. 411, 414, 90 A.2d 499, 502 (1952).
23. 345 U.S. at 364.
24. Simonson v. Granquist, 287 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1961) (Hamley, J., expressing
contrary views), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 38 (1961); In re Fidelity Tube
Corp., supra note 15; Brust v. Sturr, 237 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v.
England, 226 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1955); In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d
808 (6th Cir. 1948) (dictum).
25. 382 U.S. 266, 269 (1965).
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to invalidate unrecorded federal tax liens against the trustee in
bankruptcy. The 1950 amendment to section 70c of the Bankruptcy
Act which vested the trustee in bankruptcy with the rights of an
individual holding a judicial lien on the bankrupt's property was
deemed to have been intended to encompass the lesser rights of a
"judgment creditor."26 Furthermore, the House report accompanying
the amendment indicated that its intent was not to reduce the rights
of a trustee, but rather to extend to him further "protection ... and
to some extent expand ... [his] rights."2 7
The Court noted that in enacting section 6323 of the Internal
Revenue Code to succeed section 3672, an unsuccessful attempt had
been made to exclude statutory judgment creditors from protection
against unrecorded tax liens. However, it was finally deemed advis-
able to allow judicial interpretation to continue to govern "existing
law" and section 6323 was enacted without the proposed exclusionary
clause.2 Since at this time the Gilbert interpretation of section 3672
had not been held applicable to trustees in bankruptcy, the Court
considered it likely that the reference to "existing law" was to the
rule of United States v. Sands, permitting protection of trustees under
this section.2 Further it found that subsequent ineffective attempts
to amend sections 70c and 6323 so as to expressly include trustees
within the protection of section 6323 were efforts to "remove ... an
erroneous gloss placed upon ... [section 6323 of the Code] by the
courts" following the Gilbert case.30 The Court felt that the legislative
histories of the acts were wholly inconsistent with any attempt to
apply the Gilbert holding to the instant case, and further distinguished
Gilbert by pointing out that the need for uniformity which compelled
that narrow decision was absent in a case determining the rights of
a trustee in bankruptcy since such rights are already governed by
uniform federal law.
31
In following the policy of equitable distribution of the bankrupt's
26. Id. at 273 n.11.
27. Ibid; H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
28. 382 U.S. at 273; S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
29. 382 U.S. at 274.
30. Ibid.
31. Id. at 271. The Court summarily dismissed the government's final contention
that §§ 70c and 6323 could not immunize a trustee against an unrecorded tax lien
because such result would preclude the possibility which appears to be contemplated
by § 67, sub. b, that a federal tax lien not perfected until after bankruptcy may
nevertheless be "valid against the trustee." The Court said, "The purpose of Section
67, sub. b, insofar as tax claims are concerned, is to protect them from section 60, 11
U.S.C. Section 96 (1964 ed.), which permits the trustee to avoid transfers made
within four months of bankruptcy. . . . It does not nullify or purport to nullify the
consequences which flow from the Govermuent's failure to file its perfected lien
prior to the date when the trustee's rights as statutory judgment creditor attach-
namely, on filing of the petition in bankruptcy." Id. at 278.
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estate in preference to the policy of security for federal tax revenues,
the Court was in accord with both congressional intent and the
demands of equity and practicality. The effect of giving unrecorded
tax liens first priority, at the expense of other creditors, or of permitting
such lienors subsequently to attack the trustee's distributions would
be to hold the other creditors liable, in part, for the bankrupt's federal
tax debts.32 This seems particularly harsh where the creditors are
dependent on the bankrupt's obligations for their livelihood as in the
case of unpaid wage earners and where, as here, the government liens
are secret and afford no opportunity for taking precautions against
them. The policy of section 6323 was to provide relief from the
inequities of secret liens. 3 To exclude trustees from protection under
section 6323 would defeat this policy and work a great injustice
since the debt payments precluded by the secret tax lien would be
discharged forever. On the other hand, to include trustees within the
protection of that section would not defeat the policy of securing
federal revenues since it would be an easy matter for the federal
government to record its liens4 and since even unrecorded federal
tax liens are not discharged in bankruptcy. 2 It has been further
suggested that the increased costs of obtaining credit resulting from
the ever present threat of government lien priorities has limited
business prosperity to the extent of costing the government tax reve-
nues in the long run.36 This damage would be aggravated by restrict-
ing the relief granted under section 6323 in the manner suggested by
the Gilbert doctrine.
By reducing the status of unrecorded federal tax liens to fourth
priority in the class of unsecured creditors,37 the instant case sub-
stantially reduces the assets available to satisfy delinquent federal
32. For a discussion of the dissatisfaction with federal tax debt priorities, see
MacLachlan, Improving the Law of Federal Liens and Priorities, 1 B.C. IND. &
Commvl. L. REv. 73 (1959); Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal
Government, The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALI. L.J.
905 (1954), Note, 35 IND. L.J. 351, 358 n.58 (1960).
33. Kennedy, supra note 32, at n.99.
34. "This responsibility of recording liens does not impose a heavy burden on taxing
bodies. The precise amount of the tax due need not be determined within the six-
month period for the filing of claims. An unliquidated claim may be filed within the
statutory period, and an amended claim may, in property situation, be filed after the
expiration of that period." Seligson, supra note 19, at 717.
35. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, § 17(a) (1), 52 Stat. 851 (1938), as amended, 74
Stat. 409 (1960), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1964).
36. MacLachlan, supra note 32, at 75.
37. Section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 104a (1964) set up the following priorities subsequent to payment of secured
claims: (1) expenses of the administration and preservation of the estate, (2) wage
claims; (3) expenses of successful opposition to the arraignment of discharge and
of adducing evidence resulting in conviction of a bankruptcy offense; (4) federal,
state, and local tax claims.
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tax bills of bankrupt parties against whom no lien had been recorded.38
The effect of this holding will no doubt be the government's recorda-
tion of tax liens as a matter of course, particularly in light of the
increased number of bankruptcies in recent years.39 The instant
case does not represent the Court's disenchantment with the general
priority granted federal tax liens. It does indicate a willingness to
effect the intended limitation on that priority embodied in section
6323 of the Code, and may indicate an increased willingness to find
a party within the protection of that section when a separate
statute, such as 70c, purports to grant him the status or rights of a
judgment creditor.
Constitutional Law-Applicability of the
Fourteenth Amendment to a Charitable Trust in
Which a State Agency Was the Original Trustee
In 1911, Senator Augustus 0. Bacon executed a will which devised
a tract of land to the city of Macon, Georgia, for use as a segregated
park.' Until it became evident that the fourteenth amendment2 pro-
hibited segregation of public parks, the city operated the facility on
a segregated basis. Thereafter Negroes were permitted to use the
park. Individual members of the park's Board of Managers3 brought
this action to remove the city as trustee and to have the court appoint
private trustees to whom title to the park would be transferred.
Several Negro citizens of Macon intervened alleging that this was
38. "[O]nly 13% of the straight bankruptcy cases are 'asset' cases in which there
is something for creditors. . . . Of the total proceeds realized . . . [approximately
$50,077,000 per year] about 30% goes for administrative and other expenses and
70% to creditors, which is sufficient to pay about 18% of the total claims .... Secured
creditors come first to the extent of their security and realize an average recovery of
two-thirds of their claims. Next ...priority creditors realize an average of one-third
recovery." Countryman, Bankruptcy Boom, 77 I-Auv. L. REv. 1452, 1453-54 (1964);
Note, 35 IND. L.J. 351 n.6 (1960).
39. In the ten year period, 1953-1962, total bankruptcy filings have quadrupled,
increasing from 40,087 in 1953 to 123,878 in 1962. Countryman, supra note 38,
at 1452; Morris, supra note 10, 616 n.1. At the same time federal tax lien suits
were increasing from 1,000 in 1950 to 3,875 in 1962. COOGAN, HoGAX, & VACTS, op.
cit. supra note 13, II 12.01(2), at 1253.
1. Senator Bacon stated in his will that, while he had only the kindest feelings for
the Negro race, he was of the opinion that "'in their social relations the two races
(white and negro) should be forever separate."' Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 297
(1966).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. The will provided that the park should be under the control of a Board of
Managers consisting of seven persons, all of whom were white. 382 U.S. at 297.
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a step toward re-segregating the park and asking that the court refuse
to appoint private trustees.4 The city, admitting that it could not
carry out the terms of the trust by enforcing racial segregation in the
park, resigned, and the court appointed new trustees. On appeal by
the Negro intervenors, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed,5 stating
that the appointment of private trustees was necessary to prevent
failure of the trust. On certiorari6 to the United States Supreme Court,
held, reversed. Where the tradition of municipal control of a park is
firmly established, appointment of private trustees accompanied by
no change in municipal maintenance does not authorize segregation
in the park under the fourteenth amendment. Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966).
The courts have long recognized that the fourteenth amendment's
prohibition against racial discrimination does not apply to discrimina-
tory acts by private individuals, but only to those instances involving
significant state action.7 Exactly how much state action is necessary to
bring the fourteenth amendment into play is not clear. Where the
state directly discriminates against a given race, the fourteenth amend-
ment's applicability is clear. A discriminatory statute or city ordinance
is obviously prohibited state action.8 Similarly, the fourteenth amend-
ment prohibition has regularly been applied to a state agency acting
as trustee for a private charitable trust. For example, in Pennsylvania
v. Board of Trusts,9 the court held that refusal by city trustees to
admit Negro students to a college was discrimination by the state,
even though the city was acting under a private will 0 requiring that
the college be segregated. This prompted state courts to substitute
private trustees and uphold their exclusion of Negroes on the grounds
that there was no longer any state action involved." The Supreme
4. The heirs of Senator Bacon also intervened and asked for a declaration that the
trust property would revert to the Bacon estate in the event that new trustees were
not appointed. Since the state courts appointed new trustees, they found it unnecessary
to consider the claim of the heirs. On remand to the state courts, the Georgia Supreme
Court held that the trust had failed and the property should revert to the heirs.
148 S.E.2d 329 (Ga. 1966).
5. Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573 (1964).
6. 380 U.S. 971 (1965).
7. Civil Bights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
8. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
9. 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
10. This was the will of Stephen Girard which established a trust for white male
orphans. For a complete discussion of the case, see Clark, Charitable Trusts, the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957).
11. In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958). It is
interesting to note that in two earlier decisions in which the trust created by the will
of Stephen Girard was being attacked, the Supreme Court commented that if the city
were legally incapable of acting as trustee, a new trustee should be appointed rather
than have the trust fail. In these cases, however, there was no consideration of the
applicability of the fourteenth amendment. Girard v. Philadelphia, 74 US. (7 Wall.)
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Court denied certiorari' 2 and has refused to decide whether judicial
substitution of private trustees under such circumstances constitutes
state action.
13
The more difficult problems arise where state discrimination is in-
direct. In Shelley v. Kraemer,14 the Court held that judicial enforce-
ment of a racially restrictive covenant in a private contract constituted
state action. Barrows v. Jackson'5 extended this holding to include
judicial award of damages for the breach of such a covenant. At least
one federal court has indicated that this same principle might apply
to a court order requiring a private trustee to abide by discriminatory
terms of a private trust.
16
In the instant case, the majority, through Mr. Justice Douglas,
observed that for many years the park had been an integral part of
the city's recreational facilities. The city granted the park a tax
exemption and provided maintenance and police protection during
that time.17 The majority assumed that the city continued to maintain
the park after resigning as trustee. 8 On the basis of this assumption,
1, 12 (1868); Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126, 188 (1844).
12. 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
13. Several state courts have summarily rejected the idea that the Shelley principle
applies to trusts. See note 14 infra and accompanying text. Gordon v. Gordon, 332
Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955); United States Nat'l
Bank v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530, 275 P.2d 860 (1954).
14. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
15. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
16. Guillory v. Administrators, Tulane Educ. Fund, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La.
1962). Negroes brought suit asking that they be allowed to enroll in Tulane Univer-
sity of Louisiana, a private university established under the will of Paul Tulane. The
will restricted the gift to white males. After a lengthy discussion the court concluded
that there was not sufficient state involvement to require compliance with the fourteenth
amendment, even though 7% of the University's funds could be traced to state
sources, certain state officers were members of the Board of Trusts, and a tax
exemption had been granted for all property of the University. Then, in commenting
on whether the heirs of Paul Tulane could require the trustees to abide by the
discriminatory terms of the will, the court stated, "Indubitably the Tulane Board is
free to act as it wishes since neither this nor any other court may exercise its power
to enforce racial restrictions in private covenants." Id. at 687.
17. Justices Harlan and Stewart believe that even this is supposition, since Senator
Bacon's will left other property in trust precisely in order to maintain the park. They
ask: "Why should it be assumed that these resources were not used in the past for that
purpose, still less that the new trustees, now faced with a challenge as to their right to
effectuate the terms of Senator Bacon's trust, will not keep Baconsfield privately main-
tained in all respects?" 382 U.S. at 318 (dissent).
18. Mr. Justice White joins the dissenters in questioning the propriety of this
assumption. "On the contrary, the city's interest would seem to lead it to cut all ties
with the operation of the park. . . . I refer to possible inferences from the city's
self-interest solely to emphasize that the record affords absolutely no basis for inferring
continued involvement of the city in the management and control of the park. What
the majority has done is to raise a presumption of one fact by showing the absence
of proof of the converse. To postulate in this manner that the city's involvement has
not been dissipated is simply a disguised form of conjecture and, I submit, is an
insufficient basis for decision of this case." Id. at 304, 305.
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they held that the mere change of trustees, without any change in
the public operation and maintenance of the park, would not effec-
tively transfer the park from the public to the private sector. There-
fore, state action was still present, and the private trustees were
subject to the requirements of the fourteenth amendment. The major-
ity viewed the park as similar to a police department, a fire depart-
ment, or a street, since the service rendered even by a private park
is "municipal in nature."19 Apparently applying Marsh v. Alabama,2 0
the majority stated that "state courts that aid private parties to
perform a public function on a segregated basis implicate the State
in conduct proscribed by the fourteenth amendment."2' 1
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice White charged that the
majority's opinion was based on "a disguised form of conjecture."22
Nevertheless, he reached the same result by finding state action in
the passage of a statute23 by the Georgia legislature. The statute
authorized restriction of a charitable trust to a particular race. He
argued that the trust, in the instant case, could not have been legally
executed under Georgia law prior to the enactment of this statute. 4
However, since the statute enabled the discriminatory terms to be
included in the charitable trust, it departed from strict neutrality in
matters of private discrimination and therefore constituted unconstitu-
tional state action.25
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice
Stewart, echoed the charge that the majority decision was apparently
based on mere conjecture. The dissenters2 would have dismissed the
19. Id. at 301.
20. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In this case the Court held that, even though a private
company owned the streets in a company town, it could not deny people on those
streets the rights guaranteed by the first amendment since the streets had a public
character.
21. 382 U.S. at 302.
22. See note 18 supra.
23. GA. CoDE. ANN. § 69-504 (1957).
24. The dissent disagrees with this conclusion and rejects the thesis for three reasons:
"First, it is by no means clear that Georgia common law would not have permitted
user restrictions on such a park in trust, so that the statute was but declaratory of
existing law pro tanto. . . . There is, however, absolutely no indication %vhatever in
the record that Senator Bacon would have acted otherwise but for the statute, a gap
in reasoning that cannot be obscured by general discussion of state 'involvement' or
'infection.' Third, it could hardly be argued that the statute in question was
unconstitutional when passed, in light of the then-prevailing constitutional doctrine; that
being so, it is difficult to perceive how it can now be taken to have tainted Senator
Bacon's will at the time he made his irrevocable choice." 382 U.S. at 316-17 n.l.
25. Id. at 306.
26. Mr. Justice Harlan was joined in his dissent by Mr. Justice Stewart. Mr.
Justice Black dissented in a separate opinion stating that the only question before the
Court was whether the city had a right to resign as trustee. Concluding that it is
obvious the city had such a right, he warns that nothing in his opinion should be taken
to mean that the private trustees may segregate the park. Id. at 314.
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writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because the constitutional
question, if presented at all, was not sufficiently clear to be adjudi-
cated. Speaking on the merits, which they considered only because
the majority reached them, Justices Harlan and Stewart found nothing
that could constitute state action of the kind necessary to bring the
fourteenth amendment into play. They argued that the majority
opinion, while ostensibly grounded upon unwarranted assumptions,
was actually based on the "public function" of the park. They
pointed out that the Marsh case, the origin of the "public function
theory," is shaky precedent since the theory in that case received the
support of only five members of the Court and has not been the
basis for any other decision. A logical application of the "public
function" test, it was argued, would require that all private facilities
whose primary purpose is to serve the public conform to the fourteenth
amendment. Such an application would have far-reaching conse-
quences.27
The majority opinion in this case is neither impressive nor con-
vincing. Indeed, it appears to be little more than a rationalization of a
result which the Court was determined to reach. The exceptionally
broad language creates doubt as to the Court's actual holding.28
Moreover, by basing their opinion on the assumption of continuing
municipal involvement in the maintenance of the park, the majority
has restricted the holding to a set of facts which is not likely to recur.
Indeed, it now appears that the city did not maintain the park after
resigning as trustee. This very restricted holding makes the case of
questionable value as precedent for future decisions.
In spite of its doubtful value as precedent, the decision is sig-
nificant in that it evidences a willingness on the part of a majority
of the Court to apply the equal protection requirement of four-
teenth amendment to discriminatory charitable trusts where the
original trustee was a state agency. This is a step which the Court
was not willing to take in 1958 when it denied certiorari in the
Girard College case.2 9 Perhaps in the near future the Court will be
called upon to decide a case in which it will have to state the
basis for the fourteenth amendment's application without assuming
27. Mr. Justice Harlan suggests that this reasoning would not only outlaw racial
discrimination in private schools, but would also jeopardize the existence of denomina-
tionally restricted educational facilities. A host of other functions, such as libraries,
orphanges, detective agencies, and even garbage collection companies, which parallel
fields of government activity, might also be affected. Id. at 322. The first amendment
may offer some protection to denominational schools and thus things may not be
quite as bad as Mr. Justice Harlan indicates. Clark, supra note 10, at 1012.
28. 382 U.S. at 321-22 (dissent).
29. Supra note 11. The fact that the Court refused to grant certiorari in the Girard
College case surprised many scholars. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 10.
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additional facts. Then it will be able to delineate explicitly its reasons
for applying the fourteenth amendment to certain charitable trusts.
The alternatives ignored by the Court may be of more significance
than the approach actually adopted. No member of the Court sug-
gested that the many Court functions essential to creating and
maintaining a charitable trust might constitute state action.30 The
Court might well have applied the Shelley principle and found state
action in the judicial substitution of private trustees in the instant
case."' The tax exemption, which would seem to be a likely place
to find state action, received only passing mention. Indeed, the Court
seems to have gone far out of its way to avoid the question of what
activities relating to trusts constitute state action. This indicates, no
doubt, that the Court appreciates the many problems which would
arise out of a holding that judicial activity in charitable trusts consti-
tutes state action. 32
Justices Harlan and Stewart apparently feel that the fourteenth
amendment should not be applied to private trustees of a charitable
trust under any theory. Their concern over the "public function" test
seems to be justified in view of the ramifications which this theory
might have in all areas of the law. All the other members of the
Court,- however, seem to think that private trustees of charitable
trusts should be subject to the fourteenth amendment requirements
30. "The power to dispose of property at death is a privilege granted by law and
supervised through probate and administration by courts and judicially appointed
fiduciaries. While these incidents of ministerial control have been thought too slight
to constitute state action, the state's role in a charitable trust is all this and much more.
The trust becomes operative only after a court has found, either specifically or by
inference, that it is charitable. Nor has government remained neutral. To encourage
a continuous flow of funds into philanthropic enterprises, it bestows privileges, of
which tax immunity is only one. The state creates and defines charitable trusts, grants
them perpetual existence, modernizes them through cy pres, appoints and regulates the
trustees, approves accounts, construes ambiguous language in the trust charter and
sometimes goes so far as to impose a less stringent standard of tort liability on such
trusts than on their private counterparts. These are practical benefits, granted or
withheld by the action of government." Clark, supra note 10, at 1003-04. (Footnotes
omitted.)
31. Supra note 13.
32. The concurring judge in the Girard Will case felt realization of this possibility
"would shock the people of Pennsylvania and the people of the United States more
than a terrible earthquake or a large atomic bomb." 386 Pa. 548, 613, 127 A.2d 287,
318 (1956).
33. Mr. Justice White seems to be as anxious as the majority to reach the results in
this case without upsetting the law of trusts. Although his argument is more in line
with what has traditionally been considered state action, it is not without its own
shortcomings. The fact that the statute was enacted before there was any policy against
segregation might have some merit as a refutation of this argument. The most significant
shortcoming of using this argument to justify application of the fourteenth amendment
to charitable trusts generally is that in most cases there will probably be no such
discriminatory statute to serve as state action.
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in instances where the trustee was originally a state agency. If this
is a desirable result, the Court should reach it with as little disruption
of the existing law as possible. The best solution would appear to
be the application of the Shelley doctrine to judicial substitution of
private for public trustees solely to enable segregated operation of
the trust properties. This approach would allow the Court to prohibit
segregation in cases like Girard, or the instant case, but would not
affect the law applicable to private trusts which never had a public
trustee.
Constitutional Law-Clandestine Surveillance of
Public Toilet-Not an Unreasonable Search
Appellants were convicted in the federal district court of violating
the Assimilative Crimes Act,' which declares, inter alia, that acts
committed on federal property not made crimes by Congress can be
punished as federal crimes under the laws of the state in which the
property is located. The offense of oral copulation, a criminal act
under California law,2 was committed in Yosemite National Park in a
men's toilet and washroom at Camp Curry, a resort maintained and
operated by a government concessionaire. 3 The prosecution's evidence
consisted of a park ranger's testimony, and photographs taken without
a search warrant through holes drilled in the ceiling above the toilet
stalls.4 Appellants objected to the admission of evidence, claiming that
all of the evidence against them was obtained in violation of the
1. "Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved
or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty of any act or omission which,
although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if
committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or
District in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of such
act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment."
18 U.S.C. § 13 (1964). 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1964) defines special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States and provides: "The term 'special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States,' as used in this title includes: (3) Any
lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive
or concurrent jurisdiction thereof...
2. CAL. PEN. CODE § 288(a).
3. Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 252 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 981 (1966).
4. Park rangers had received information that the restroom was being used as a
"hangout" by homosexuals. After conferring with the resort manager it was decided
that a hole about 6 inches square and covered with a screen so as to make it look
like an air vent would be cut in the ceiling. Thereafter, on two successive Saturday
nights, during late evening hours when it was assumed that families would not be using
the facility, rangers conducted a surveillance. It was a result of this second surveillance
that the arrests here in question were made.
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fourth amendment to the United States Constitution,5 and that a
conviction would be contrary to California Supreme Court decisions
on similar facts.6 The objection was overruled. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held, affirmed. A police
officer's observation and photographing of occupants in an enclosed
public toilet stall is not an unreasonable search within the fourth
amendment where police had reasonable cause to believe that the
stalls were being used in commission of crime. Smayda v. United
States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
The fourth amendment, which has now been incorporated into the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,7 prohibits unrea-
sonable searches and seizure of persons, or their houses, papers, or
effects 8 by agents of either the federal9 or state governments.10 It
was primarily intended to protect the right of privacy, i.e., the right
of undisturbed enjoyment of one's property unless entry by officials
is under proper authority." It also secures the right of self-protection:
the right to resist unauthorized entry by the state perpetrated to obtain
information against the individual which might be used to effect a
further deprivation of life, liberty, or property.'2 The Supreme Court
5. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. Appellants relied primarily upon two California cases, Bielicke v. Superior Court,
57 Cal. 2d 602, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552, 371 P.2d 288 (1962) (pay toilet with lock) and
Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849, 374 P.2d 817 (1962) (door
could be locked). In each case it was held that the surveillance was an unreasonable
search, forbidden by both the CAL. CONST. art I, § 19 and U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.,
and that the evidence thus obtained was inadmissible.
7. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). "The security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is
basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and
as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause." Id. at 27-28.
But see ScHuBERT, CoNSTiTrloINAL PoLrmics 618 (1960).
8. See note 5 supra. An interesting discussion of the history of the evils designed to
be prevented by the fourth amendment can be found in Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476, 481-85 (1965). See also Sounczs oF Oun Liazans 418 (Perry & Cooper ed.
1959).
9. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
10. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952).
11. Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 7, at 27-29; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 14, 17 (1948). See RoTTScHAEz, CoNsTiunoONA LAw 741 (1939); Note,
Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28
U. Cm. L. RiEv. 664, 667 (1961).
12. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
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has recognized that this latter protection is also secured by the self-
incrimination clause of the fifth amendment.13 Thus, evidence of
criminal action generally may not be seized without a judicially issued
search warrant. One exception to the search warrant requirement is
that of a search incident to a lawful arrest.14 A second exception,
based upon the idea that the object to be searched could easily be
moved out of the reach of authorities before a warrant could be
obtained, is a search of vehicles where there is probable cause for
believing that the vehicles contain contraband or forfeited goods.'5
In any event, unless the facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge are sufficient to warrant a reasonable man to believe that
an offense has been or is being committed, the search will be without
probable cause and hence unlawful. 16 In Weeks v. United States 7
the Supreme Court declared that evidence seized by federal police in
violation of the fourth amendment was not admissible in the federal
courts. The "exclusionary rule" adopted in that case was not immedi-
ately made applicable to the states; only after the Supreme Court's
decision in Mapp v. Ohio8 in 1961 was it established that the four-
teenth amendment prohibited the admission of evidence obtained by
an unreasonable search or seizure in prosecutions in state courts.1 9
Prior to Mapp, however, California 0 and several other states2' had
adopted a rule which precluded the use of illegally obtained evidence
in state courts. In the federal courts, in order to raise the claim that
evidence has been seized in violation of the fourth amendment, a
party must establish that there was a physical invasion 2 of his
13. "[T]he 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amend-
ment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence
against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and
compelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,' which is
condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an
'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Boyd
v. United States, supra note 9, at 633.
14. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
15. Carroll v. United States, supra note 9.
16. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963).
17. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
18. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Traynor, "Mapp v. Ohio" At Large in the Fifty States,
1962 Dur L.J. 319; Wilson, Perspectives of "Mapp v. Ohio," 11 KAN. L. REv. 423
(1963).
19. Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 7.
20. See People v. Caban, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). The state court
refused to admit evidence obtained by officers who, without a search warrant, entered
the premises of a bookmaker and installed microphones and took papers.
21. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960) (appendix). This case
represented an intermediate step between Weeks, supra note 17, and Mapp, supra note
18, in that it abolished the "silver platter doctrine," the practice of using evidence in
federal courts that had been illegally obtained by state police.
22. See Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (microphone hidden on under-
196]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
constitutionally protected interest in the place or thing searched or the
property seized.23 But this interest is not limited to the literal language
of the fourth amendment, and the concept of the protected interest
has expanded significantly. 24 Searches of a generalized nature, with
or without a warrant, which are conducted solely for the purpose of
acquiring evidence of guilt are characterized as "exploratory," and
are deemed unreasonable by both state and federal courts.2
In the principal case, the basic issue confronting the court was
whether one's right of privacy as protected by the fourth amendment
extended to activities in a public toilet stall so as to preclude admis-
sion of evidence secured by a clandestine surveillance. In answering
the question in the negative, the court relied upon two alternative
grounds: (1) if the ranger's conduct was a "search," appellants
impliedly consented to it and (2) there was no "unreasonable search"
within the meaning of the amendment.26 The court cursorily dismissed
appellants' contention that their conviction was contrary to California
law with the response that the Assimilative Crimes Act27 created a
federal offense which referred to California statutes only for definition
and penalty, and did not incorporate the entire criminal or constitu-
tional law of that state.28 Discussing the first alternative, the court
cover agent); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (hearing device in
adjoining room). Cf. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962) (electronic device to
overhear conference in jail).
23. See Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, O'Kelley
v. United States, 326 U.S. 724 (1945).
24. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, supra note 10 (hotel room); Rios v. United States,
364 U.S. 253 (1960) (taxi); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (apartment);
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (private automobile and office); Amos
v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (locked store); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (private portion of business office).
25. See Stanford v. Texas, supra note 8; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, supra note 9; Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Britt v.
Superior Court, supra note 6. The generalized search had long been held in
disapprobation in England as can be seen in this speech of Chatan: "The poorest man
may, in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its
roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may
enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his forces dare not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement." 2 COOLEY, CONsvtrmoNAL LmirTArsONS 611 n.1
(8th ed. 1927).
26. 352 F.2d at 253. The court's first alternative, implied consent or waiver, is,
at best, a tenuous basis for the decision. While one may consent to what would
otherwise constitute an illegal search, to state that one constructively consents to such
searches or impliedly waives fourth amendment rights by engaging in criminal con-
duct in a public facility is a concept of consent that is unsupported by federal case law.
See Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260 (1964).
27. See note 1 supra for the text of this act.
28. It cannot be disputed that the Assimilative Crimes Act does not incorporate the
entire body of state law to which it looks for the definition of the crime and the
penalty. McCoy v. Pescor, 145 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1944); United States v. Andem,
158 Fed. 996, 1000 (D.N.J. 1908).
[ VOL, 19
RECENT CASES
concluded that when people resort to a public toilet for criminal
purposes, they run the risk that they may be observed by police
officers; they are not protected from such observation simply because
they choose the most nearly "private" part of such a facility-the toilet
stall.2 19 Quoting at length the language of the California District
Court of Appeal in People v. Young m the court stated that to hold the
public toilets to be "off limits" from clandestine surveillance by police
would encourage their use by those engaged in criminal activities.
Moreover, the court stated that since members of the public could
have viewed appellants' conduct merely by peering over or under the
partition of the stall or by pushing open the door, appellants had
waived any right of privacy they may have had.31 The court's second
alternative ground for the decision, the reasonableness of the search,
32
was premised upon the literal language of the fourth amendment-
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects . . . ." Clearly, there had been no search of persons or
papers and effects. The court reasoned that even if the stalls were
private places analogous to houses, the appellants used them subject to
their present condition which included the holes in the ceiling.3 In
sustaining the search as one based upon cause, the court referred to
complaints by camp guests and writings on the walls of similar
facilities which indicated that the particular toilet was a "hangout"
for homosexuals.34 In addition, there was no invasion of appellants'
29. The court discussed at length the dimensions of the stalls and the opportunity
that persons who entered the restroom would have to witness the offense by looking
over or under the door. Obviously the stall was a semi-public area within a public
area so far as the majority was concerned.
30. 214 Cal. App. 2d 131, 29 Cal. Rptr. 492 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Officers viewed
the restroom from a vantage point in a gardener's toolshed. The toilet in the restroom
had neither doors nor sides, and was exposed to any person who entered the restroom.
The court declared the testimony of the officers to be admissible.
31. The same position was adopted by another California court in People v. Norton,
209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Officers observed
occupants of an enclosed toilet stall which had no door through a marble partition
separating one part of the restroom from another. The court concluded that under
such circumstances, an occupant of one of the toilet stalls waived any right of privacy
he may have had.
32. Judge Pope was unwilling to agree that the appellants waived any right of
privacy they had, and concurred in a separate opinion wholly on the basis of the
second alternative stated by Judge Duniway. Judge Pope adopted the position that
at no time was there an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.
33. 352 F.2d at 256. The court stated that no rights of the appellants had been
violated when the holes were cut since it had been done under proper authorization;
nor had any rights been invaded when the ranger and photographer went into the
attic.
34. Hearsay, if properly corroborated, may be enough to establish probable cause.
See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.




right of privacy since they were only entitled to assume that the
facility would afford a modicum of privacy, and that privacy was
limited. 5 Judge Browning dissented, stating that the fourth amend-
ment protects such privacy as a reasonable person would suppose to
exist in given circumstances. Judge Browning conceded that the stall
afforded only a modicum of privacy, but felt it was that modicum of
privacy which the officers had invaded. 3 According to him, probable
cause was sufficient to authorize a warrant, but it could not justify
search without one.
The conduct of the park ranger in the instant case constituted a
search according to both federal37 and states authorities, and the
ultimate question is the reasonableness of the search. What constitutes
a reasonable search depends upon the particular facts in each case,3"
and as suggested above, a search will be deemed reasonable under
federal law if it involves no physical trespass to a protected interest."
The court found no such trespass in this instance. Essentially the
decision constituted a rejection by the federal court of the standard
established by California state courts prohibiting police surveillance
of areas not easily accessible to the public even where no trespass
was involved.41 For the federal court to have adopted the state stand-
ard would have narrowed the scope of permissible searches under
the fourth amendment. The requirement of physical trespass to a
protected interest is an anachronism in the law of search and seizure,
probably having its roots in the history of man's concern for private
property. To decide cases on this criterion is to lose sight of the fact
that modern technology has provided instrumentalities permitting
extensive searches without a prohibited invasion under present stand-
ards. Moreover, personal privacy may require a standard of rea-
sonableness different from that utilized to protect property. Personal
privacy should be accorded full protection against any police invasion
as long as the private interest does not run counter to the public one.
Concededly, this introduces the difficult task of balancing the individ-
35. "We would not uphold a clandestine surveillance of such an area without cause.
We are made as uncomfortable as the next man by the thought that our own
legitimate activities in such a place may be spied upon by the police. We also think,
however, that the nature of the criminal activities that can and do occur in it, the
ready availability therein of a receptacle for disposing of incriminating evidence, and
the right of the public to expect that the police will put a stop to its use all join to
place a reasonable limitation on the right of privacy involved." 352 F.2d at 257.
36. Id. at 260 (dissenting opinion).
37. See McDonald v. United States, 166 F.2d 957, 958 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
38. See, e.g., People v. Marvin, 358 111. 426, 193 N.E. 202 (1934).
39. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
40. See cases cited at note 22 supra.
41. Bielicki v. Superior Court, supra note 6.
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ual's interest in personal privacy against the public interest in com-
munity welfare; but this is more desirable than arbitrarily requiring
a physical trespass in order to declare a search unreasonable.
The reasonableness of a search should bear some relation to the
offense against which it is directed. Morals offenses between consent-
ing adults typically do not involve secular interests of the community.42
Therefore, official conduct which is unreasonable in such instances
may well be reasonable when directed against more serious criminal
conduct. Moreover, consideration should be given to the probable
cause inspiring the search. This factor is particularly relevant when,
as in the instant case, a search is conducted without a warrant. But
,the most important consideration involved in determining what
constitutes a reasonable search should be the activities of the searching
authorities. Photographing the conduct of occupants of public toilets
in order to "spy" on them is patently offensive to the concept of
privacy. Yet, the police might photograph the same individuals in
a variety of other situations in which no question of reasonableness
would arise. To limit unreasonable searches to those cases where there
has been a physical invasion of a protected interest is to oversimplify
a complex problem, and the federal courts should reevaluate the
present standard of reasonableness to harmonize it with the realities of
our society.
Criminal Law-Joint Trials-Admission of Confession
Implicating Both Defendants Held Erroneous
Defendants were arrested on suspicion of armed robbery. De-
fendant Martinez admitted that he and defendant Aranda had com-
mitted the crime; Aranda never made any admissions. Both men
were convicted in a joint trial at which Martinez's confession was
introduced in evidence. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, held, reversed as to both defendants.' In a joint criminal
trial the admission of a confession implicating both defendants is
42. See PAULSEN & KADISH, CnmsuAL LAWv AND ITS PROCESSES 3-17 (1962)
Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obsenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391
(1963).
1. The court found no indication in the record that Martinez had been advised
of his rights to counsel and to remain silent. Relying on Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964) and People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. App. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361 (1965),
both decided after the defendants' trial, the court found Martinez's confession in-
admissible and reversed his conviction. The court then turned to a consideration of
the possible prejudicial effect of the confession upon Aranda.
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erroneous because the confession may be prejudicial to the non-
declarant despite a jury instruction that it is to be considered only
against the declarant. People v. Aranda, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d
265 (1965).
Apparently all states provide for joint trials of defendants jointly
charged, with discretion in the trial court to order a separate trial
when justice so requires.2 The well-established majority rule permits
joint trials even though the prosecution intends to submit to the
jury a confession by one defendant implicating a co-defendant.3
Although the statement is inadmissible as to the nondeclarant, it
may be put into evidence so long as there is a jury instruction that
the confession is to be considered only against the declarant.4 Impli-
cating statements are to be disregarded in determining the guilt or
innocence of the nondeclaring party, even though the confession is
believed. This procedure has been upheld by the Supreme Court
of the United States.5 Despite its wide use, however, the procedure
has been severely criticized by those who feel that the jury cannot
compartmentalize their mental processes in the way the instruction
presumes. 6 A number of states, recognizing the difficulties involved,
2. See 8 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.02 (2d ed. 1965). The common law rule
leaves the question of joint or separate trial to the discretion of the trial court. 23
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 933 (1955). Many states have enacted status codifying
the common law view. For representative statutes, see CAL. PEN. CODE § 1098; N.Y.
CODE Cami. PRoc. § 391. In justification of joint trials it has been pointed out that
they conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities,
and avoid delays in the punishing of the guilty. People v. Aranda, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353,
360, 407 P.2d 265, 272 n.9 (1965).
3. Cases restating and upholding the majority rule: Deli Paoli v. United States,
352 U.S. 232 (1957); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Cwach v. United
States, 212 F.2d 520, 526-27 (8th Cir. 1954); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006
(2d Cir. 1932); People v. Ketchel, 59 Cal. 2d 503, 532, 381 P.2d 394, 410 (1963);
People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 164 N.E. 336 (1928).
4. In justifying its approval of the majority rule in the federal courts, the Supreme
Court said: "It is a basic premise of our jury system that the court states the law
to the jury and that the jury applies that law to the facts as the jury finds them.
Unless we proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the court's instructions
where those instructions are clear . . . the jury system makes little sense." Delli
Paoli v. United States, supra note 3, at 242.
5. Delli Paoli v. United States, supra note 3 (upheld federal procedure which
follows majority practice); Stein v. New York, supra note 3 (upheld constitutionality
of majority precedure in New York).
6. See Nash v. United States, supra note 3, at 1007, for Judge Hand's apology for
the rule: "[Tihe rule probably furthers, rather than impedes, the search for truth,
and this perhaps excuses the device which satisfies form while it violates substance;
that is, the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not
only their powers, but anybody's [sic] else." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Delli
Paoli v. United States, supra note 3, at 247, found even less to recommend the
rule, characterizing the cautionary instruction to the jury as "intrinsically ineffective"
because "the effect of such a non-admissible declaration cannot be wiped from the
brains of the jurors." He felt that the decided unfair advantage given the prosecutor
under the rule could be avoided only by separate trials of those inculpated by the
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have enforced rules requiring trial severance in such cases unless those
portions of the confession inculpating the co-defendant are effectively
deleted.7
The court in the instant case found that the Martinez confession
was inadmissible under Escobedo8 and reversed as to him. Turning to
Aranda, Chief Justice Traynor noted earlier decisions9 holding that the
prejudicial effect of an involuntary confession implicating both de-
fendants is not necessarily cured by an instruction that it is to be
considered only against the declarant. The court felt that, in view
of the evidence as a whole, a result more favorable to Aranda would
probably have been reached had the confession been excluded; there-
fore Aranda's conviction was also reversed. Rather than stopping
here, however, the court went on to adopt a set of rules to be followed
by California courts in considering future joint trials.10 Under these
rules, when the prosecution proposes to introduce a confession impli-
cating a co-defendant, the court must grant a severance of trials
unless it receives assurance prior to trial that the portions implicating
the nondeclarant can and will be effectively deleted. If the deletion
is not made, the trial court will exclude the entire confession in a
joint trial.1
confession. See also People v. Buckminster, 274 Ill. 435, 444, 113 N.E. 713, 716
(1916); 10 VAND. L. REv. 859, 861-62 (1957).
7. People v. Barbaro, 395 IMI. 264, 69 N.E.2d 692 (1946); People v. Bolton, 339
Ill. 225, 171 N.E. 152 (1930). These two cases state the minority view, held in Illinois,
that trial severance must be granted when an inculpating admission by a co-defendant
is to be introduced in evidence. State v. Rasen, 151 Ohio St. 339, 86 N.E.2d 24
(1949) (Ohio procedure requiring deletion or severance); See also People v. Buck-
minster, supra note 6, at 716; State v. Castelli, 92 Conn. Supp. 58, 101 AUt. 476 (1917).
8. Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 1, held that the right to effective counsel or to
remain silent arises as soon as attention centers on a particular suspect and the
investigation enters an accusatory stage.
9. Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir. 164); People v.
Gonzales, 136 Cal. App. 2d 666, 69 Pac. 487 (1902); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d
148, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 193 N.E.2d 628 (1963); People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561,
216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 175 N.E.2d 445 (1961). These cases, like the instant case, found
prejudice to the non-declarant where the confession admitted under the majority
procedure was subsequently held involuntary and inadmissible.
10. People v. Aranda, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 363, 407 P.2d at 272-73. The rules were
adopted pursuant to the CAL. PEN. CODE § 1098, which vests discretion in the courts
to grant trial severance when justice so requires.
11. People v. Smith, 46 Cal. Rptr. 382, 409 P.2d 222 (Sup. Ct. 1966), decided since
Aranda, makes clear that these rules are subject to the "harmless error" provision of
the California Constitution, which means that failure to comply with them may not
necessarily be grounds for reversal. The pertinent parts of the provision are: "No
judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted ...for any error as to any matter
of procedure, unless the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4 . In Smith, the
court afred a conviction even though the appellant had been inculpated by an
inadmissible confession in a joint trial. The court reasoned that the independent
evidence against the appellant was so overwhelming that the inadmissible confession
was not prejudicial to him.
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In the instant case the court dealt with two similar but distinct
problems. On the facts, it held that a non-declarant co-defendant was
prejudiced by the introduction of an inadmissible confession incul-
pating him, even though the usual cautionary instruction had been
given to the jury. The court went beyond the facts, however, and
adopted a set of rules dealing with all implicating confessions in
joint trials whether or not admissible as to the declarant. This was
an express adoption in California of the minority view which requires
courts to grant severance if the implicating portions of the confession
are not effectively deleted. The rules, the court declared, "are to be
regarded, not as constitutionally compelled, but as judicially de-
clared rules of practice ...."-12 Yet the opinion expressed "grave
constitutional doubts" about "whether or not it [the old procedure]
is constitutionally permissible."13 It implied that the United States
Supreme Court is likely to reverse its previous position upholding the
majority procedure. The court apparently felt that two recent decisions
have undercut the authority of earlier precedent 14 and have set the
stage for a decision holding the majority procedure unconstitutional.
Jackson v. Denno 5 held that it violated due process to rely on a jury's
presumed ability to disregard an involuntary confession. The Jackson
rationale should seemingly apply with equal force to a jury's presumed
ability to disregard, as to the nondeclarant, a co-defendant's confession.
Pointer v. Texas' 6 incorporated the sixth amendment right of confron-
tation into the fourteenth amendment, thus making it applicable to the
states. This casts some doubt on a procedure in which one may, in
effect, be accused without opportunity for cross-examination of one's
accuser. These developments, the court feels, will probably compel
another Supreme Court test of the majority procedure, with a holding
12. Id. at 272.
13. ibid.
14. Deli Paoli v. United States, supra note 3; Stein v. United States, supra note 3.
15. 378 U.S. 368 (1963). The case held that the New York practice of submitting
the question of voluntariness of confession to the jury along with the other issues in
the case was unconstitutional. It was reasoned that notwithstanding the instruction,
the jury would be affected in their determination of guilt or innocence by a confession
which they believed even though they found it involuntary. See The Supreme Court, 1963
Term, 78 HAv. L. REv. 143, 213 (1964) ("Because of these close parallels between
Jackson and Deli Paoli, Jackson may foreshadow a holding that the Delli Paoli
procedure violates due process.")
16. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The grounds for finding the majority procedure uncon-
stitutional would probably be fourteenth amendment due process and the sixth amend-
ment right to confront and cross-examine one's accuser. Yet the sixth amendment did
not prevent the Court from approving the majority procedure as used in the federal
courts, Deli Paoli, supra note 4, so it is not immediately apparent why the application
of the sixth amendment to the states should imperil the procedure in state courts.
Nevertheless, the California court views Pointer as casting further doubt on any rule
which purports to cure an encroachment on the right to confrontation by an instruction
to disregard inadmissible evidence.
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of unconstitutionality likely. Considering the California court's
reputation for being years ahead of the United States Supreme Court
in this area of constitutionally permissible criminal procedure, 17 its
views on the outcome are not to be taken lightly.
A holding of unconstitutionality would further limit the traditional
view that use of the jury system presupposes that the jury is capable
and willing to follow the clear instruction of the court in applying
law to fact. 18 Even if such an assumption is generally valid and
justified, however, there would seem to be little reason to subject
the jury to the stress of a difficult and demanding instruction if
workable alternatives are available. It seems highly doubtful that the
average juror can really be expected to disregard a confession which
he believes to be true and which inculpates an alleged accomplice.
To do so would require a degree of mental discipline quite beyond that
of the average man. The newly adopted California procedure offers a
simple expedient which will insure fairer administration of justice
without consequent undue burdens upon the state. Joint trials,
it is submitted, will continue to be the rule rather than the exception
under this procedure. In many cases, the prosecution will be able to
get a confession which does not implicate others; and deletion of the
inculpating portions will be possible in most other cases.' 9 Thus
trial severance will probably not be required in a greatly increased
number of cases so as to burden the time and funds of the state.
17. See Time, Jan. 24, 1966, p. 48; Manwaring, California and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 16 STAN. L. REv. 318, 323 (1963).
18. See Delli Paoli v. United States, supra note 3, at 242. The reasoning in Jackson
v. Denno, supra note 15, rejected the assumption that the jury can and will do as
instructed in all cases. The court indicated a willingness to inquire into not only
whether the instruction was clearly understood, but also whether it is reasonably
probable that the jury can and will follow the instruction.
19. Deletion presents special problems, however. "Effective deletion" will require
the striking of all plural pronouns and other constructions from which the jury could
infer that others were involved. Otherwise, the jury will make the obvious inference
that the other person was the co-defendant sitting before them beside the confessor.
Furthermore, the heavy deletion required may reduce the confession to an absurdity.
Obviously, substituting "X" for the name of the co-defendant is not an effective deletion.
Also, the nature of the crime confessed to, such as the theft of a Grand piano, could
raise an inference that others were involved. But whether severance would be granted
in such instances is doubtful.
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Evidence-No Cross-Examination of Defendant's
Character Witnesses as to His Prior Arrests and
Conviction if Their Contact With Him Had
Terminated Before Such Arrests and Convictions
Defendant was convicted in the federal district court of assault and
assault with intent to kill. She had been arrested three times previ-
ously on similar charges and convicted on one occasion.' Defendant
presented two character witnesses, neither of whom was familiar with
her reputation for peacefulness and good order in the community in
which the prior arrests and conviction had occurred. Both character
witnesses revealed, on cross-examination, that their contact with the
defendant had terminated before the date of the first arrest.2 On
cross-examination, the trial judge, over defense counsel's objection,
permitted the prosecution to ask both witnesses if they had heard of
the accused's prior arrests and conviction. On appeal to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, held, reversed. Permitting
cross-examination of a character witness as to defendant's prior arrests
and conviction constitutes abuse of judicial discretion when the wit-
ness is unfamiliar with the defendant's reputation either in the com-
munity where the prior arrests and conviction occurred or at the time
of their occurrence. Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
The rule that the prosecution may not initiate an attack upon the
defendant's character is firmly established.3 However, once the de-
1. The defendant was arrested in 1963 and 1964 for assault with a deadly weapon.
The defendant's husband filed the complaints in the aftermath of domestic quarrels.
The conviction for disorderly conduct, also stemming from a domestic quarrel, oc-
curred in 1962. Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641, 642 n.2, 645 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
2. The defendant's first character witness was a minister in a town fifteen miles
from the district, who testified that he knew the defendant when "she was just a
kid." He stated he knew nothing about defendant's reputation in Washington. Both
the arrests and the conviction occurred after the defendant had left the minister's
community. The second witness, a supervisor at defendant's former place of employ-
ment, testified that she knew nothing of defendant's reputation in the community
for peacefulness and good order, but testified that she had "never had any com-
plaints about defendant's behavior . . . or her work." On cross-examination she
testified that she knew nothing about the defendant after 1961, a date prior to the
arrests and conviction. Id. at 644-45.
3. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948); Mackreth v. United
States, 103 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 1939); Leverette v. State, 104 Ga. App. 743,
744-45, 122 S.E.2d 745, 746 (1961); People v. Hetenyi, 304 N.Y. 80, 88, 106
N.E.2d 20, 24 (Ct. App. 1952); State v. Garceau, 122 Vt. 303, 306, 170 A.2d
623 (1961). See also 2 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1949). According to Wigmore,
this rule is "firmly and universally established in policy and tradition." He attributes
the rule to "the inborn sporting instinct of Anglo-Normandom-the instinct of giving
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fendant has placed his character in issue,4 by calling witnesses to
testify as to his reputation in the community at the time of the
alleged crime,6 the prosecution may then cross-examine such char-
acter witnesses concerning the defendant's prior arrests7 or call
rebuttal witnesses for the purpose of introducing evidence of bad
character.8 The rule allowing the prosecution to cross-examine a
defendant's character witness is based upon the principle that the
witness's testimony is always answerable to the demands of credibil-
ity.' Since reputation testimony must be based solely on hearsay
evidence,10 the inquiry on cross-examination is necessarily restricted
to those prior events of which the witness has heard, but has no
personal knowledge." According to the majority rule embraced by
the game fair play even at the expense of the efficiency of procedure." 1 WIGMORE,
EvDENcE § 57, at 546 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WiGmoRE].
4. McCormick states that the expression "placing his character in issue" is mis-
leading, since character is merely circumstantial evidence bearing on the probability
of guilt, and as such it is almost never an operative fact determinative of guilt or
innocence. McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE § 158, at 334 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
CoarcICK].
5. According to McCormick, reputation evidence is the only method of proving
character. Certain jurisdictions, however, as well as the Model Code of Evidence
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, permit testimony by those who have obtained
knowledge of the defendant's character from observation of his conduct. Id. at 334
n.9. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 306 (2)(a) (1942); UNIFORM RULES OF
EVIDENCE 46, 47.
6. The majority rule limits reputation evidence to the time of the alleged crime or
a reasonable time before it. McCoRMIcx § 158, at 335. See also Strickland v. State,
37 Ariz. 368, 379, 294 Pac. 617, 621 (1930); People v. Willy, 301 Ill. 307, 320,
133 N.E. 859, 865 (1922); State v. Riggs, 32 Wash. 2d 281, 284, 201 P.2d 219, 221
(1949). The term "community," although usually synonymous with place of residence,
is extended by the better view to include a place of business. United States v. White,
225 F. Supp. 514, 522 (D.D.C. 1963); People v. Workman, 136 Cal. App. 2d 898,
902, 289 P.2d 514, 516 (1956); State v. Axilrod, 248 Minn. 204, 210, 79 N.W.2d
677, 682 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957); McCoRm-CK § 158, at 335; 5
WIGMOaE § 1616.
7. See generally McCoRmICK § 158. The special rules pertaining to the cross exami-
nation of a character witness must not be confused with those applicable in im-
peaching the veracity of the defendant-witness who takes the stand to testify. In the
latter case the initiative is transposed and the defendant is precluded from bolstering
his reputation until the prosecution has attacked it. Id. at 334 n.7.
8. See generally 1 WIGMORE § 58.
9. 3 WIGmoE § 988, at 618. According to Wigmore, a witness's knowledge of
prior arrests will either entirely discredit testimony that the witness has never heard
any ill spoken of the defendant, or it will prove a deficiency in the witness's testimony
that the community concensus is favorable to the accused. Ibid. Cross-examination
is used only for purposes of testing the credibility of the witness's testimony, and
does not go to the substantive question of guilt or innocence. 3 WHARTON, CRIAINAL
EVIDENCE § 865, at 249 (12th ed. 1955).
10. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477. Wigmore states that character
testimony is hearsay since it is an expression of community opinion uttered out of
court and is thus not subject to cross-examination. 5 WIGOmRE § 1609.
11. The form of questioning on cross-examination has become stereotyped. Quite
uniformly the courts limit the questions to "Have you heard"? and hold it reversible
error to permit the inquiry "Do you know"? Stewart v. United States, 104 F.2d 234,
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the Supreme Court in Michelson v. United States,12 the scope of cross-
examination includes prior arrests and convictions reflecting traits of
the defendant's character which are likewise an ingredient of the
immediate offense. 13 The "Illinois Rule" narrows the permissible area
of inquiry to acts of misconduct similar to the crime in issue.14 Other
courts have held that particular instances of misconduct are inadmis-
sible since the questioning should pertain only to the "general
character" of the defendant.'5 Similarly, Mr. Justice Rutledge in his
dissenting opinion in Michelson favored the exclusion of all inquiry to
235 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ("the witness on cross-examination should be asked only-"Have
you heard"?-not--"Do you know"?); People v. Marsh, 28 Cal. Rptr. 300, 309, 58
Cal.2d 732, 745-46, 376 P.2d 300, 308-09 (1962); Baker v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 627,
629, 230 S.W.2d 219, 220 (1950). See Kasper v. United States, 225 F.2d 275, 279
(9th Cir. 1955) (suggestion that "Did you know or have you heard"? is objection-
able). But see State v. Shull, 131 Ore. 224, 227, 282 Pac. 237, 240 (1929) (no
prejudicial error in "Do you know of his having beaten up on a girl a year or two
ago . . ."?). Cases are collected in 3 WAARToN, CMUNAL EvmExNCE § 865, at 256-
57 n.20 (12th ed. 1955) and 3 WieldRoE § 988 n.1. McCormick contends that it
should be proper to direct the questioning to the witness's knowledge when indict-
ments, convictions, crimes committed in public and imprisonment are involved,
since they are common knowledge in the community. McComncK § 158, at 335-36.
12. Supra note 3. In Michelson, the defendant appealed a conviction of bribing a
federal revenue agent. The defendant alleged that the trial court committed error in
allowing the prosecution on cross-examination to ask his character witnesses whether
they had heard of the defendant's arrest twenty-seven years prior to the date of
the trial. The Supreme Court found no prejudicial error.
13. People v. Marsh, supra note 11; Adams v. District of Columbia, 134 A.2d 645,
648 (Munic. Ct. App. 1957). Compare Travis v. United States, 247 F.2d 130, 132-
33 (10th Cir. 1957), reo'd on other grounds, 364 U.S. 631 (1961). Cases are col-
lected in Annot., 71 A.L.R. 1504 (1931) and Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 1258 (1956);
2 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1949).
14. Aside from dictum in People v. Hannon, 381 11. 206, 44 N.E.2d 923 (1942),
the "Illinois Rule" is apparently misnamed. The court in Hannon stated "Where the
matters about which the inquiries are made have no connection with or relation to the
offense charged it is reversible error to ask such questions. . . . The witnesses were
not asked as to rumors and reports . . . but were interrogated as to their knowledge
of such assumed facts and of specific acts which were not of a generic nature."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 211-12, 44 N.E.2d at 925. Compare the Illinois court's
position in People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524, 6 N.E.2d 845 (1937). See generally Com-
ment, 40 J. Cimr. L. & C. 58, 60 (1949). One commentator attributes the substance
of the "Illinois Rule" to Judge Frank's opinion in United States v. Michelson, 165
F.2d 732, 735 (2d Cir. 1948); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 780 (1961).
15. North Carolina is the leading jurisdiction adopting the "general character"
rule. State v. Robinson, 226 N.C. 95, 96, 36 S.E.2d 655 (1946) ("State . . .
could not . . . offer evidence as to particular acts of misconduct of the defendant.");
State v. Shepherd, 220 N.C. 377, 17 S.E.2d 469 (1941) (character witness may be
questioned as to the general reputation of the defendant concerning particular vices or
virtues). Accord, Commonwealth v. Butts, 204 Pa. 302, 310, 204 A.2d 481, 486
(1964) ("... character may be discredited only by evidence of general reputation,
and not by particular acts of misconduct"); People v. Page, supra note 14 (general
reputation for particular matter or misconduct); Viliborghi v. State, 45 Ariz. 275,
286-87, 43 P.2d 210, 215 (1935) (" . . . the questions must not be in such form
as to imply specific acts of misconduct .... ").
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specific incidents in the defendant's past life.16 There is unanimous
agreement that any inquiry concerning prior arrests or convictions is
"pregnant with possibilities of destructive prejudice."17 In an attempt
to combat this possible prejudice, the courts have toyed with proce-
dural technique 18 and have mentioned sanctions for instances of bad
faith by the prosecutor.19 Ultimately, however, most courts have
placed the burden on the discretion of the trial judge.20
The court in the instant case, guided by the decision in Michelson,
emphasized the active role of the trial judge in weighing the probative
value of the cross-examination against the possible prejudice to the
defendant.21 Drawing an analogy to Jackson v. Denno, 2 and noting
16. Mr. Justice Rutledge cautioned about trying a defendant for all prior misconduct,
criminal or otherwise, and contended that the prosecution and the defendant should
be on the same "plane" as far as the use of character evidence is concerned. Michel-
son v. United States, 335 U.S. at 496. See generally Comment, 40 J. Ciui. L.&C.
58-59 (1949) for a discussion of the Justice's "fair play" rule.
17. McCoMCscK § 158, at 336. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. at 479-80,
494; People v. Hannon, supra note 14, at 209, 210, 44 N.E.2d at 925; People v. Page,
supra note 14, at 528, 6 N.E.2d at 847.
18. McCormick suggests that the trial judge, prior to cross-examination, should be
required to receive reasonable assurance from the prosecutor that the prior crimes,
misconduct, or convictions did in fact occur. The procedure should take the form
of a bench conference in the absence of the jury. In the instant case the defense coun-
sel questioned the admissibility of the cross-examination, at a bench conference
but the trial judge permitted the questioning. 352 F.2d at 644. In People v. Dorrikas,
354 Mich. 303, 92 N.W.2d 305 (1958), the court held, with three judges dissenting,
that the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to ascertain, out of the
presence of the jury, the actuality of the prior acts as well as their time and place of
occurrence. The court also held that the trial judge erred in not properly instructing
the jury as to the limitations of the cross-examination. The court reversed even
though the defendant had not objected at the trial level.
19. Cases are collected in Annot., 71 A.L.R. 1504, 1541-43 (1931) and Annot., 47
A.L.R.2d 1258, 1314-22 (1956). According to McCormick, "actual reversals on this
ground [the prosecution's bad faith] are exceedingly rare." (no cases cited).
McComucsrc § 158, at 336 n.19. Perhaps the most common instance of bad faith on
the part of the prosecutor is the propounding of questions concerning prior arrests
that lack a factual basis. See People v. Thomas, 23 Cal. Rptr. 161, 58 Cal.2d 121,
373 P.2d 97 (1962).
20. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Michelson, supra note 3, best expresses
this position: "To leave District Courts of the United States the discretion given to
them by this decision presupposes a high standard of professional competency, good
sense, fairness and courage on the part of the federal district judges. If the United
States District Courts are not manned by judges of such qualities, appellate review,
no matter how stringent, can do very little to make up for the lack of them." 335
U.S. at 487-88. But cf. Mr. Justice Rutledge's statement in his dissenting opinion
in Michelson: "Nor is it enough, in my judgment, to trust to the sound discretion of
trial judges to protect the defendant against excesses of prosecution." Id. at 494.
21. The court cited Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965) for the
proposition that although the defendant "has opened the door" to the cross-examina-
tion, it is the trial judge who is to decide what passes through.
22. 378 U.S. 368, 388 (1964), 18 VAD. L. REv. 237 (1964). The case held that
the submission of the question of the voluntariness of a confession to the jury, without
the trial judge first having made an independent determination of voluntariness, does
not afford a defendant a reliable determination of voluntariness and is violative of
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the psychological fact that juror's minds are not compartmentalized,
the court stated that "cautionary instructions, copiously provided by
the trial judge" fail to afford the accused adequate protection once
prejudicial testimony has been introduced. 23 That the questions asked
on cross-examination were highly prejudicial was made apparent by
the nature of the testimony presented on direct examination. The
testimony of the first witness pertained to defendant's reputation at
an earlier time and in a different community. The testimony of the
second witness revealed that she did not know the defendant's
reputation for peacefulness and good order in the community where
the prior arrests and conviction occurred. In fact, the prosecution
could have had the testimony of both witnesses stricken as irrelevant.24
In addition, the cross-examination of the second witness was incapable
of impeaching her direct testimony, since the arrests occurred after
her association with the defendant had terminated.25 The court
acknowledged the criticism of the rule allowing a defendant's prior
arrests to be revealed during the cross-examination of his character
witnesses; it refused, however, to reverse the procedure "at this
time."2 Instead, the court urged that trial judges limit the practice
to situations where cross-examination is necessary to establish witness
credibility and where prejudice to the defendant does not outweigh
the probative value of the testimony.
The rule permitting the defendant in a criminal prosecution to
present character witnesses is justified as a relevant means of resolving
probabilities of guilt.2 7 Testimony that the defendant's reputation
is favorable may create in the minds of the jurors a reasonable doubt
as to the defendant's guilt. Likewise, such testimony may even
lead the jury to infer that the defendant did not commit the
offense charged.2 The prosecution is allowed to cross-examine the
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The instant court's reference
was to the Supreme Court's rhetorical question whether the jury, after receiving
instructions to disregard an involuntary confession, unconsciously resorts to the
confession when there are doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence. See generally
3 WrcmomE § 988, at 619-24.
23. 352 F.2d at 645-46.
24. Id. at 644-45.
25. Ibid.
26. Id. at 646.
27. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. at 476.
28. In discussing the basis of the rule allowing the criminal defendant to present
character witnesses, Mr. Justice Rutledge stated: "[T]he rule is justified by the ancient
law which pronounces that a good name is rather to be chosen than great riches. True,
men of good repute may not deserve it. Or they may slip and fall in particular situa-
tions. But by common experience this is more often the exception than the rule. More-
over, most often in close cases, where the proof leaves one in doubt, the evidence of
general regard by one's fellows may be the weight which turns the scales of justice.
It may indeed be sufficient to create a clear conviction of innocence or to how that
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character witnesses concerning the defendant's prior arrests and con-
victions for purposes of testing the credibility of their testimony.
This right to cross-examine and introduce rebuttal witnesses appears
sound, since the testimony of the defendant's character witnesses
may be used by the jury for substantive purposes to decide the issue
of guilt or innocence, rather than for the impeachment purposes of
testing credibility. Objection to the current practice of including
prior arrests and convictions in the cross-examination is based on
the possible prejudice to the defendant and the apparent inadequacy
of the trial judge's instructions in eliminating this prejudice. The
court in the instant case, while recognizing both the prejudicial effects
of the current practice and the widespread criticism that the practice
has engendered, has attempted to minimize the prejudicial effects
by establishing certain judicial guidelines for the trial judge. These
guidelines, which have the effect of limiting the trial judge's discre-
tion, have delineated concrete examples of abuse of judicial discretion.
Henceforth, reference to prior arrests on cross-examination will be
precluded when the witness's testimony relates to the defendant's
reputation in a different community or at an earlier time, or when
the testimony reveals that the witness has known nothing about
the defendant since before the prior arrest. Additional developments
might well be expected if the decision receives favorable acceptance.
The court noted with approval the use of the bench conference,29
and subsequent case law may vindicate earlier decisions that required
this procedure.30 In addition, the courts may put some substance
into the good faith requirements that have often been mentioned,
but rarely applied.31 For example, the trial court could have discon-
tinued the cross-examination of the second witness once her lack of
knowledge was established, on the ground that further inquiry would
constitute bad faith. Although the court has effectively limited the
instances in which the prosecution may cross-examine a defendant's
character witness as to prior arrests and convictions,2 the success
reasonable doubt which our law requires to be overcome in all criminal cases before
the verdict of guilty can be returned." Id. at 490-91.
29. The court noted that the bench conference would permit the trial judge to
weigh considerations of prejudice and probative value. 352 F.2d at 646 n.14.
30. People v. Dorrikas, supra note 18.
31. See note 19 supra.
32. By emphasizing the need for reforming the present system the court in the
instant case has distinguished itself from the reluctant position taken by the Supreme
Court in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). The Court in Michelson
stated: "We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters and the profession
that much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises by which an
irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counter-privilege to
the other. But somehow it has proved a workable even if clumsy system when mod-
erated by discretionary controls in the hands of a wise and strong trial court. To
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of the court's guidelines may be diminished by the prosecution's
reliance on rebuttal witnesses. Thus, the prosecution may be able to
propound certain questions to its own witnesses which, if directed to
the defendant's witnesses on cross-examination, would be precluded
under the holding in the instant case.33 Moreover, although there is
little authority on this matter, it appears that the testimony of rebuttal
witnesses, unlike the information elicited on cross-examination, may
be used by the jury as substantive evidence and not merely for
purposes of impeachment.3
Labor Law-Successful Parties May Intervene in
Appellate Court Proceedings
In the first of two cases consolidated for decision, certain employees
charged a union local with violations of the National Labor Relations
Act.' The National Labor Relations Board dismissed the complaint
and the employees sought review of the Board's decision in the Court
of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit. The successful charged party,2 the
pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset
its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice."
Id. at 486. The court in the instant case, at 646 n.13, noted that the force of this
argument is diminished by the Supreme Court's approach in Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964).
33. For example, the prosecution could have circumscribed the holding in the
instant case by introducing rebuttal witnesses familiar with the defendant's reputation
in the community at the time of the prior arrests and conviction. From a practical
standpoint, however, it would appear far easier for the prosecution to cross-examine
the defendant's character witnesses than to locate rebuttal witnesses.
34. "The rules of admissibility of character evidence . . . may be summarized
in a few clear-cut propositions. . . . If the defendant does not go upon the witness
stand, but offers evidence of his good character, the door swings open, and the state
can thereupon offer evidence of his bad character, which must be considered as sub-
stantive evidence upon the question of guilt or innocence." State v. Nance, 195 N.C.
47, 141 S.E. 468, 470 (1928). Wigmore, in citing this decision, states that the
"character rule [is] well summarized." 1 WMomE § 58, at 458 n.1. Compare: "The
accused thus runs the risk in opening the issue, for if the prosecution has convincing
evidence of the defendant's bad character for the germane trait, the jury may, and
often will, consider it a substantive, evidentiary fact, making the affirmative inference
from it that he committed the crime charged. It is important, however, to see that
technically the evidence of bad character is admissible for the sole and negative purpose
of rebutting the defendant's evidence of good character, and not as an affirmative
evidentiary fact against him." Udall, Character Proof in the Law of Evidence-A Sum-
mary, 18 U. Cice. L. Rrv. 283, 301 (1949).
1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1964) (hereinafter
.cited NLRA). The union had fined certain members for exceeding incentive pay
ceilings set by the union.
2. "Charged party" is used throughout this comment to refer to the party against




union, moved to intervene 3 in the proceedings, but the motion was
denied. In the second case, a union local charged Fafnir Bearing
Company with violations of the National Labor Relations Act.4 The
Board sustained the complaint and the company sought review in the
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit. The successful charging
party,5 the union, moved to intervene, but its motion was denied. 6 On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Either
a successful charged party or a successful charging party may inter-
vene as a matter of right in the appellate court proceedings to review
or enforce a NLRB decision. Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S.
205 (1965).
The NLRA is silent as to the rights of a successful party to review
a decision of the NLRB in appellate proceedings. However, the rules
of the various appellate courts pertaining to review of administrative
proceedings do allow "interested" persons to intervene in the court's
discretion.8 Exactly what an "interested" person is has not been
determined.9 As a matter of practice, however, the courts have usually
allowed a successful charged party to intervene, 10 but, unfortunately,
they have not articulated the bases for their decisions. Since reversal
3. A "successful party" is the party in favor of whom the Board decides. Appellate
proceedings on a NLRB decision are between the Board and the unsuccessful party.
The successful party may, at the court's discretion, enter proceedings already begun.
See note 6 infra.
4. The union charged that the company had refused to bargain collectively.
5. "Charging party" is used throughout this comment to refer to the private party
who has made charges of unfair labor practices to the Board. Upon becoming aware
of the alleged violations, the General Counsel of the Board may issue the Board's
formal complaint against the alleged violator.
6. Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1964).
7. Section 10(f) of the NLRA gives unsuccessful parties the right to seek review as
a "person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or
in part the relief sought. 49 Stat. 455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f)
(1964).
8. First Circuit Rule 16(6); Second Circuit Rule 13(f); Third Circuit Rule 18(6);
Fourth Circuit Rule 27(6); Sixth Circuit Rule 13(6); Seventh Circuit Rule 14(f);
Eighth Circuit Rule 27(f); Ninth Circuit Rule 34(6); Tenth Circuit Rule 34(6);
D.C. Circuit Rule 38(f). 3 CCH LAB. L. REP. f[ 6040 lists all the above. The First
Circuit Rule 16(6) states: "A person desiring to intervene in a case where the appli-
cable statute does not provide for intervention shall file with the court and serve upon
all parties a motion to intervene. The motion shall contain a concise statement of the
nature of the moving party's interest and the grounds upon which intervention is
sought."
9. Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, supra note 6, at 803.
10. Local 1441, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, v. NLBB, 326 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 981 (1964); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 324 F.2d
228 (2d Cir. 1963); Minnesota Milk Co. v. NLRB, 314 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1963).
Contra, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. NLRB, 267 F.2d 169 (1st Cir.), cert denied,
361 U.S. 863 (1959) (private party should not ordinarily be allowed to intervene on
the side of the Board); Haleston Drug Stores Inc. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir.
1950) (no authority to allow intervention by a successful party). The cases allowing
intervention do not discuss the question.
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of the Board normally remands the case for reconsideration, and since
the new decision is usually against the previously successful party, a
prior successful charged party might subsequently face a cease and
desist order without the opportunity to argue in favor of the Board's
original dismissal. Being aware of this, the appellate courts have
apparently felt that a successful charged party's "interest" in pre-
venting a cease and desist order is sufficient to permit intervention
under the court rules.
The appellate courts have been less consistent in dealing with
intervention attempts of successful charging parties, but in the
greater number of cases intervention has been denied." Denial has
been predicated upon the idea that since the NLRA created no
private remedy for unfair labor practices, 12 the successful charging
party has no "legal" interest.13 Traditionally the Board's orders
vindicate the interest of the public as a whole, not that of the individ-
ual complaining party. In order that this public interest might be
better served, the Board, a public agency, has been viewed as having
the exclusive power to prosecute unfair labor practices. 4 The formal
complaint is that of the Board, not the charging private party; if a
labor law violation is found and an appropriate order issued, the
Board alone may initiate proceedings to enforce that order.'" In
prior cases, the courts have taken the view that intervention by the
charging party would be incompatible with this exclusive power of
the Board. 16
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a unanimous Court, based
11. NLRB v. Florida Citrus Canners Co-op., 288 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd
on other grounds, 369 U.S. 404 (1962); NLRB v. Local 648, Retail Clerks Int'l. Ass'n,
243 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1956); Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.
1942). Contra, Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 824 (1954); West Texas Util. Co. v. NLRB, 184 F.2d 233 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1951). Note the conflict in the Seventh Circuit.
The decisions of that court give no explanation.
12. Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940),
Comment, 25 CoaiNLr. L.Q. 591 (1940). The Court cited the following from the
congressional history: "No private right of action is contemplated. Essentially the
unfair labor practices listed are matters of public concern, by their nature and
consequences, present or potential; the proceeding is in the name of the Board, upon
the Board's formal complaint." H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1935).
13. Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, supra note 6, at 803 where the court said that
no matter how deeply concerned a successful charging party might be with the out-
come of the review, such a party had no "legal interest."
14. H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 21 (1935). This concept of a dichotomy
between private and public rights or interests is attacked vigorously in Jaffe, The Public
Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HAv. L. REv. 720, 725-26 (1946).
15. Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 265
(1940).
16. See cases denying intervention, note 10 supra. The charging party has been
viewed as just another member of the public which the Board represents.
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the instant decision on three considerations: judicial expediency, fair-
ness to the parties, and the fact that the NLRA does not expressly
deny a successful party a place in the review proceedings. The Court
found that when a reviewing court set aside a NLRB decision, the
matter was remanded to the Board for further consideration, and
the Board's second decision was usually contrary to the first. The
new unsuccessful party might then seek review, but this required
additional expenditure of judicial time and energy on issues resolved in
the first review. By allowing successful parties to intervene in the
first review, however, the entire controversy would be centralized
at that point and the case could be disposed of promptly by a single
decision. 17 The Court also recognized the possibility of unfairness for
the intervenor in any second review since the reviewing court could
defer to the decision in the initial review "as a matter of stare decisis
or of comity."' 8 In order to insure effective review, the Court felt that
the successful party should be allowed to present its argument before
the views of the reviewing court became crystallized. Finally, since
the NLRA did not expressly treat the issue, the Court concluded that
Congress could not have intended, on the one hand, to deprive
parties of a right to intervene on appeal simply because they had been
successful before the Board, and, on the other, to grant that same
right to others merely because they had been unsuccessful. The Court
carefully distinguished a case denying a successful charging party
the right to initiate contempt proceedings to enforce a Board order,19
on the grounds that it was not inconsistent to deny private parties the
right to initiate proceedings to enforce a Board order and at the same
time allow such parties to join proceedings already begun.20
The older view of the NLRB's role in labor disputes has been that of
the Board as the guardian of the public's interest in freedom from un-
fair labor practices.21 Although the Board followed a policy of fostering
the development of unions,2 the unions as private individual parties
were merely incidental beneficiaries. Complaining unions and em-
ployees acted only as communication ducts through which the Board
became informed of industrial activities conflicting with its pro-labor
policy. Since the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act23 in 1947, the Board
17. Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1965).
18. Id. at 213.
19. Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
The Court denied the successful charging parties efforts on the grounds that the Board
had exclusive power to deal with unfair labor practices. Id. at 265.
20. 382 U.S. at 221. The Court stated that the NLt.A did not create a dichotomy
between private and public interests but instead blended the two.
21. Report of the Advisory Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law to the Senate
Labor Committee, S. Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1960).
22. Ibid.
23. 61. Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of title 29 of U.S.C.)
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has had to deal with the complaints of companies, as well as those of
unions and employees. This new role is analogous to that of an um-
pire.2 The public interest of which it is the custodian is now thought
to be the attainment of good order in the field of industrial relations
generally. Although the NLRB is still the public's representative in
labor disputes, its orders are not now primarily aimed at fostering
unions, but at good order attained by the vindication of essentially
private interest.2 It is the individual or private interest that is primarily
being served, with the public being relegated to the position of an
incidental beneficiary. That the Board is no longer the exclusive
agency for dealing with labor disputes is amply demonstrated by
the increasing significance of such remedies as suits under section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,26 and private arbitration,
especially in view of the Board policy of deferring to the arbitrator's
decision.27 For example, in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,28 the
Court held that a section 301 suit could be maintained by an individ-
ual employee for a contract violation, even though the particular
violation also constituted an unfair labor practice; and in Carey v.
Westinghouse Electric,"9 the Court held that arbitration was allowed
as an alternative to Board proceedings. These are "private remedies,"
and their end is the vindication of the interests of individuals. The
recognition of the substantial interest of private parties3 gives the
Board proceedings a tripartite appearance. This is compatible with
the decisions in Smith and Carey where such recognition is basic.
Thus, the instant decision seems clearly correct; the existence of
24. S. Doe., supra note 21. The report stated, "The Board is no longer charged
solely with promoting the spread of labor unions and collective bargaining. It is
largely an umpire engaged in enforcing established rules first against one party then
against the other." Ibid. "Party" refers to complaining unions and complaining com-
panies respectively.
25. Ibid.
26. Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). The statute
gives a right to bring private suit in the United States District Courts for violation of
a contract between an employer and a labor organization representing his employees.
27. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 274-75 (1964), Comment,
36 ST. Join's L. RE;v. 356 (1964)) (union is entitled to arbitration of its grievance
even though the dispute may involve matters within the jurisdiction of the NLRB).
In International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), the NLRB stated that it
would as a matter of policy defer to an arbitration decision unless its results were
repugnant to the Labor Act. The Board has even declined to issue a complaint on
the grounds that arbitration provided an adequent solution, McDonnell Aircraft Corp.,
109 N.L.R.B. 930, 935 (1954); Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951).
This policy is dictated by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1964) which states that voluntary settlements by the parties according to their own
arrangements are'to be encouraged.
28. 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962).
29. 375 U.S. 261.
30. Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. at 219.
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private interests should not be denied because a party either chose
or was forced to bring its complaint to the Board.31 Since private
interests have been recognized as having a legitimate place in Board
proceedings, it might even be desirable to amend the NLRA to
allow proceedings before the Board to be initiated by private com-
plainants.?2 This would prevent a party with no cause of action under
section 301 from being left without a remedy because of the Board's
refusal to issue the necessary complaint. In the alternative, unfair
labor practices could, by statute, be made actions in the nature of a
tort.
Taxation-Partnership Entity Not Automatically
Disregarded in a Section 1235 Transfer, Even
Though Transferors and Partners Are
"Related Persons"
In December, 1954, taxpayers entered into a contract with an
inventor whereby taxpayers agreed to assume all costs for the
development of a bath oil formula' in exchange for a- two-thirds
interest in its commercial exploitation. The parties "reduced the
formula to practice" no earlier than January 6, 1955, and obtained
a patent the following month. On May 31, less than five months
after reducing the formula to practice, taxpayers and the inventor
transferred their interests in the patent to a newly created partner-
ship, consisting of the inventor and the taxpayers' wives. In return,
the transferors received certain annual payments, measured by the
net sales of the bath oil. Relying upon section 1235 of the Internal
31. In the absence of a contract provision covering a particular unfair labor practice,
the aggrieved party would have no suit under section 301, and likewise no contract
violation to have arbitrated. Such a party could have recourse only to the Board.
32. It is arguable that the availability of arbitration and suits under section 301 makes
such a step unnecessary, possibly even undesirable. Perhaps the Board might best be
regarded as a forum for cases involving a stronger degree of public interest.
1. These costs were to include the following: $1,000 for attorney fees in connection
with the patent application; $1,000 for other legal fees; $500 to be paid a chemist
for producing samples of the product; $5,000 to $6,000 for the cost of producing a
50-gross commercial batch; and $2,000 to $3,000 for laboratory testings of the product.
Max A. Burde, 43 T.C. 252, 254 (1965).
2. Thus, as a result of the contract, each party received a one-third interest in the
bath oil formula.
3. Taxpayers received a flat $2,500, plus 6% of the net sales commencing January
1, 1956. During the year in question, 1958, this amounted to $19,484.33 for each
of the taxpayers.
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Revnue Code of 1954,4 taxpayers reported these payments as capital
gains. The Tax Court disregarded the partnership entity and held the
payments taxable as ordinary income since section 1235 does not
apply to transfers between "related persons."5 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit rejected the theory that the partnership entity
should be disregarded in all section 1235 cases, but held, affirmed. In
determining whether transferors and a partnership are related per-
sons, the partnership entity is not automatically to be disregarded,
but rather the tests to be applied are those set out in section 707 (b) (2)
providing that in certain situations the gains derived from a transfer
involving a partnership shall be treated as ordinary income. 6 Burde
v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1965).
Section 1235(d) denies section 1235 coverage to transfers between
"related persons," and specifically refers to section 267(b) for defi-
nition of this term. Section 267(b) defines related persons in terms
of members of a family, corporations, fiduciaries and grantors of
trusts, and certain educational and charitable organizations, but makes
no reference to partnerships. Therefore, a court could conclude that
this omission indicates a congressional intent not to include partner-
ships within the concept of related persons.7 A possible means of
avoiding this result is to apply the same percentage tests to partner-
ships that section 267(b) applies to corporations; that is, where an
4. INT. BEV. CODE OF 1954, § 1245: "(a) GENEanL.-A transfer (other than by
gift, inheritance, or devise) of property consisting of all substantial rights to a patent,
or an undivided interest therein which includes a part of all such rights, by any
holder shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than
6 months, regardless of whether or not payments in consideration of such transfer
are (1) payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the transferee's
use of the patent, or (2) contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the
property transferred."
5. INT. BEv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235(d): "(d) RELATED PERSONS.-Subsection (a)
shall not apply to any transfer, directly or indirectly, between persons specified within
any one of the paragraphs of section 267(b); except that, in applying section 267(b)
and (c) for purposes of this section-(1) the phrase '25 percent or more' shall be
substituted for the phrase 'more than 50 percent' each place it appears in section
267(b), and (2) paragraph (4) of section 267(c) shall be treated as providing that
the family of an individual shall include only his spouse, ancestors, and lineal
descendants."
6. INT. lEv. CODE OF 1954, § 707(b)(2): "(2) GAINS TREATED AS ORDINARY
n coWrE.-In the case of a sale or exchange, directly or indirectly, of property, which,
in the hands of the transferee, is property other than a capital asset as defined in
section 1221-(A) between a partnership and a partner owning, directly or indirectly,
more than 80 percent of the capital interest, or profits interest, in such partnership,
or (B) between two partnerships in which the same persons own, directly or in-
directly, more than 80 percent of the capital interest or profits interests, any gain
recognized shall be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of property other
than a capital asset."
7. This theory was urged by taxpayers; the court, however, found it probable that
Congress had never considered the question. 352 F.2d at 999.
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individual or a group of individuals owns fifty per cent or more of
the assets of a partnership, any transfer between the two would be
considered a transfer between related persons not qualifying for
section 1235 treatment.8 This approach gains additional weight
from the fact that similar treatment is accorded both corporations
and partnerships in situations where a business entity theory of
partnerships is used.9 Another possibility is to disregard the partner-
ship entity in all section 1235 situations, and to treat the partners
in their individual capacities. 10 In support of this position, con-
gressional reports indicate that where appropriate, the partnership
entity can be disregarded." As a final alternative, section 707(b) (2)
tests could be applied in determining when a partnership was a related
person-an approach adopted by the court of appeals.
Agreeing that to permit capital gains treatment would frustrate
section 1235(d),'12 the majority and concurring opinions differed
mainly over the amount of control the transferors must hold in the
partnership before section 1235 is inapplicable. The majority was
concerned with the resulting injustice if the partnership entity were
disregarded 13 in all section 1235 situations, regardless of the amount
of control. The court investigated the only two alternatives it thought
to be realistically available, 14 and decided to apply the eighty per
cent control test of section 707(b) (2) rather than disregard the
8. The majority made no mention of this possibility. The concurring opinion did
mention it, but only in a passing manner as a possible ideal solution. Id. at 1005.
9. Compare § 721 (concerning the nonrecognition of gain or loss on ownership
contributions to a partnership), with § 351 (concerning a transfer to a corporation
controlled by the transferor). Compare § 723 (concerning the basis of property con-
tributed to a partnership), with § 362 (concerning the basis of property acquired by a
corporation). Section 1361 expressly provides that, in certain situations, partnerships
may be taxed as corporations.
10. This was the theory proposed by the Commissioner and followed in the Tax
Court. 352 F.2d at 998.
11. "No inference is intended, however, that a partnership is to be considered as a
separate entity for the purpose of applying other provisions of the internal revenue laws
[than § 707] if the concept of the partnership as a collection of individuals is more
appropriate for such purposes." H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1954).
12. Both the majority and the concurring opinion concluded that to permit capital
gains treatment in the instant case would be to permit it where the asset remained
within "essentially the same economic group," a result definitely not intended by
Congress. 352 F.2d at 1000, 1003.
13. "If this were the rule [that in all § 1235 cases it is necessary to 'pierce the
partnership veil'], then the transfer of a wholly owned patent to a partnership in
which the transferor (or a related person) owned but a small interest would fail to
qualify for capital gains rates to the extent of the transferor's partnership interest, in
spite of the fact that the patent was no longer controlled within essentially the same
economic group. This result was rejected in Weller v. Brownell, 240 F. Supp. 201,
208-10 (M.D. Pa. 1965) .... Id. at 999.
14. The third alternative, that of treating the partnership as a corporation under
§ 267(b), was never really considered as an available alternative. See note 8 supra.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
partnership entity in all section 1235 situations. The concurring opin-
ion, on the other hand, concluded that it would be more in line with
congressional intent of the partnership entity were automatically dis-
regarded in all section 1235 cases. In support, it pointed out that
the fifty per cent control tests ordinarily applied to corporations by
section 267(b) had been reduced to twenty-five per cent where
coverage under section 1235 was sought.'5
Finding no reference to partnerships in section 267(b), the ma-
jority turned to section 707(b) (2) because similar congressional
policies concerning transfers within the same economic group
supported both this section and section 1235. In order to apply
section 707(b) (2), the majority found it necessary to consider the
agreement between the transferors as constituting a partnership, 16
even though it conceded that many of the normal incidents of a
partnership were not present.17 Since no single transferor had an
eighty per cent ownership interest, as required for application of
section 707(b) (2),18 the majority was forced to consider the trans-
ferors as a whole.' 9 This approach indicates that while there would
be no "related persons" under section 707(b) (2) if there were only
one transferor owning as much as seventy-nine per cent control,
there would be such "related persons" if four transferors each owned
twenty- per cent. This arbitrary distinction appears incongruous
with section 1235's purpose of taxing all transfers within essentially
the same economic group. Even though capital gains treatment was
not available under section 1235, it might have been obtained had
the section 1222(3) requirements, normally incident to capital gains,
been met.20 Little difficulty would be encountered in meeting two of
these requirements since there had been a "sale or exchange"21 of
15. See note 5 supra for the text of this section.
16. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 707(b) (2)(B). See note 6 supra for this section.
17. "Although some of the factors often found relevant to the existence of a joint
venture, such as joint bank accounts, filing of partnership returns, an agreement to
share losses, are not present in this case, single factor is controlling." 352 F.2d
at 1002.
18. Although § 707(b) (2) made reference to transfers between individuals and
partnerships, and between partnerships, it made no reference to transfers between
individuals who as a group owned most of the transferee partnership assets, no single
individual and related person, however, owning more than 80%.
19. To justify this position, the majority again directed attention to the fact that
there had been no substantial change in the economic ownership of the patent as a
result of the transfer. 352 F.2d at 1000.
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1222(3); "(3) LONG-TEIm CAPrIAL GAIN.-The term
'long-term capital gain' means gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held
for more than 6 months, if and to the extent such gain is taken into account in com-
puting gross income."
21. Although the question once arose as to whether or not a transfer of a patent in
return for periodic payments based upon its use met the "sale or exchange" require-
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a "capital asset." 2 The third requirement necessary for capital
gains treatment, however, could not be met. The period between
the time the patent was reduced to practice and the transfer in
question had been less than five months, and section 1222(3) requires
that the capital asset be held by the transferors for a minimum of
six months. Consequently, capital gains treatment under section
1222(3) was unavailable. Another possible approach to the problem
of determining whether there had been a transfer between related
persons should have been considered. The majority noteds in passing
that during the year in question, the payments received by the
transferors were made by a corporation since the partnership had
been incorporated in an earlier year. The court might have utilized
a more satisfactory method for denying capital gains treatment by
looking to the ultimate incorporation of the partnership as the net
result of the transaction. Section 1235(d)2 provides that the general
rule of section 1235 shall not apply to any transfer which is directly
or indirectly between persons specified within any one of the para-
graphs of section 267(b). This section defines as a transfer between
related persons a transfer between a corporation and the owner of
more than fifty per cent of the stock of that corporation. It might
be concluded, therefore, that a transfer to a partnership which is later
incorporated is an indirect transfer between "related persons." Con-
sequently, such a transfer would come within the exceptions to the
general rule of section 1235, and would thus be denied capital
gains treatment. In any event, since the policy underlying section
1235(d) requires similar treatment of transfers within essentially
the same economic group, there appears to be no reason for affording
ment, the question now appears to be settled in the affirmative. Some courts found it
difficult to conceive of the receipt of periodic payments based upon the use of a
patent as meeting this requirement. Instead, often it was thought more closely akin to
a license. As of late, however, at least with respect to patent interests, the Treasury
has taken the position that such a transfer does meet this requirement. Kurtz,
Distinctions Between License and Capital Transaction on Transfer of Patent, N.Y.U.
23d INsT. oN FaD. TA X 135, 139 (1965).
22. As long as the inventor is not a "professional," courts have usually considered
his patent right a capital asset. This requirement, generally speaking, has not been
difficult to show. Mann, Capital Asset Status of Patents and Inventions Under General
IRC Sections 1221-1223, 42 TAXEs 317 (1964). Likewise, the taxpayers would also
be thought to have possessed an interest in a capital asset since they had not employed
the inventor and had taken part in the development of the bath oil formula prior to
its reduction to practice. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d) (1954).
23. "On January 2, 1956, Emory and the wives resuscitated a dormant corporation
(Sardeau, Inc.), transferred to it the assets and liabilities of Sardo by Sardeau, and
extinguished the partnership. The corporation took over the royalty payments to
Emory and the husbands. . . . For purposes of this case we can ignore the incorpora-
tion of the partnership and treat the royalities as if received directly from the
partnership." 352 F.2d at 997.
24. See note 5 supra for the text of this section.
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special treatment to transfers involving partnerships. It would seem
that the same tests applied to corporations under section 267(b)
might most appropriately determine which transfers involving part-
nerships may qualify for section 1235 treatment.
Taxation-Section 1231 v. Section 165(c)(3)-
Uninsured Casualty Loss to Personal Residence
Must Be Offset Against Section 1231 Gains
In 1960, the taxpayer sustained an uninsured 5000 dollar casualty
loss when an ice storm damaged trees, shrubbery and other improve-
ments to her personal residence. In the same year, she realized a
gain of approximately 19,000 dollars from the sale of an orange
grove held for the production of income. In her return, the tax-
payer deducted the loss from her adjusted gross income pursuant to
section 1651 and treated the sale of the orange grove as a section
12312 long-term capital gain. The District Director disallowed the
deduction, claiming that the uninsured casualty loss was an involun-
tary conversion under section 12313 which had to be netted against
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165(a): "There shall be allowed as a deduction any
loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or other-
wise." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c)(3): "In the case of an individual, the
deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to-(3) losses of property not con-
nected with a trade or business, if such loss arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or
other casualty, or from theft. A loss described in this paragraph shall be allowed only
to the extent that the amount of loss to such individual arising from each casualty, or
from each theft, exceeds $100."
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231(a): "If during the taxable year, the recognized
gains on sales or exchange of property used in trade or business, plus the recognized
gains from the compulsory or involuntary conversion (as a result of destruction in
whole or in part, theft or seizure, or an exercise of the power of requisition or condem-
nation, or the threat or imminence thereof) of property used in trade or business
and capital assets held for more than 6 months into other property or money, exceed
the recognized losses from such sales, exchanges, and conversions, such gains and
losses shall be considered as gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital
assets held for more than 6 months. If such gains do not exceed such losses, such
gains and losses shall not be considered as gains and losses from sales or exchanges
of capital assets. . . . In the case of any property used in trade or business and of
any capital asset held for more than 6 months and held for the production of income,
this subsection shall not apply to any loss, in respect of which the taxpayer is
not compensated for by insurance in any amount arising from fire, storm, shipwreck,
or other casualty, or from theft."
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231(a)(2): "[Llosses upon the destruction, in
whole or in part, theft or seizure, or requisition or condemnation of property used
in trade or business or capital assets held for more than 6 months shall be considered
losses from a compulsory or involuntary conversion." While the code section says an
involuntary conversion occurs when there is conversion "into other property or money,"
the regulation says there need not be a conversion "into other property or money."
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the gain received from the orange grove. The district court found for
the plaintiff and ordered a refund.4 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, held, reversed. Even though there is no conversion
into other property or money, an uninsured casualty loss of a capital
asset held for more than six months must be offset against section
1231 gains. Morrison v. United States, 355 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1966).
In its inception, section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code of
19545 provided capital gain treatment to taxpayers whose business
property had been requisitioned in furtherance of the war effort.
6
If insurance proceeds were realized from certain business conversions,
they also received the favorable capital gains treatment.7 Congress
did not just countenance "war time profits and losses" in the statute,
but also included within the scope of these involuntary conversions8
losses or gains realized from the fire, theft, or destruction of capital
assets held for over six months.9 Since many taxpayers sold their
business property to the government because of an impending threat
of condemnation and seizure, Congress found it necessary to add
gains or losses from the sales or exchanges of business property to
section 1231.10 Thus, the scope of section 1231 was broadened con-
Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(e) (1965): "For purposes of section 1231, the terms 'com-
pulsory or involuntary conversion' and 'involuntary conversion' of property means
the conversion of property into money or other property as a result of complete or
partial destruction, theft or seizure, or an exercise of the power of requisition or
condemnation, or the threat or imminence thereof. Losses upon the complete
or partial destruction, theft, seizure, requisition, or condemnation of property are
treated as losses upon an involuntary conversion whether or not there is a conversion
of the property into other property or money. . . . For example, if a capital asset
held for more than 6 months, with an adjusted basis of $400, but not held for the
production of income, is stolen, and the loss is not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise section 1231 applies to the $400 loss."
4. Morrisson v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).
5. "Section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 corresponds to Section
117(j) of the 1939 Code. Although somewhat rearranged, the Section has not been
substantially changed from prior law ....... METENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
(Code Commentaries) § 1231:1 (1965).
6. BrrrERn, FEnzRAI. INCOME ESTATE AN G=T TAXATION 553 (3d ed. 1964).
Maurer v. United States, 284 F.2d 122, 123-24 (10th Cir. 1960): "The avowed
purpose [of § 1231] was to allow taxpayers, whose property had been seized in fur-
therance of the war effort a capital gain rather than increase in ordinary income.
This is so because not infrequently the taxpayer received much more for his seized
property than his depreciated cost, and it seemed unjust to tax him at wartimes
exceptionally high income tax rates."
7. BrrKEn, op. cit. supra note 6, at 553. Insurance proceeds received after the
sinking of American vessels received favorable capital gain treatment provided by
§ 1231.
8. See note 3 supra.
9. BrrTEn, op. cit. supra note 6, at 553. Sale and exchanges of capital assets held
for more than six months are also brought within § 1231.
10. Id. at 554.
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siderably from its original purpose." All these section 1231 transac-
tions are added together, and if an overall gain results, it is taxed
as a capital gain. An overall loss, however, is treated as an ordinary
loss. 12  Section 165(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
confers an ordinary deduction from adjusted gross income13 to losses
involving an individual's nonbusiness property if such "losses arise
from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty or from theft."14
Congress allowed the deduction only if the loss was not "compen-
sated for by insurance or otherwise." 5 Treasury Regulation section
1231-1(e),' 16 created the conflict between section 165(c) (3) and
section 1231.17 This regulation states that "losses upon the complete
or partial destruction . . . of property are treated as losses upon an
involuntary conversion whether or not there is a conversion into
other property or money . .. ".18 The statute on its face, however,
defines an involuntary conversion to be a conversion into other
property or money, thus permitting a not unreasonable inference that
it means only a loss which has been, to some extent compensated
for by insurance or otherwise.' 9 Since the regulation has existed
as long as section 1231, the Commissioner has argued2 that it has
11. Id. at 554. In order to come within § 1231, the property must be held for more
than six months. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231. 3B MERTENs, FEDERAL TAXAnON § 22.125, at
520 (Zimet & Weiss rev. 1958): "After all the gains and all the losses from section
1231 transactions are ascertained, the gains and losses are aggregated respectively, and
one total is offset against the other, leaving a net gain or a net loss. A net gain,
or an excess of gains over losses, is treated as a capital gain; a net loss, or an excess
of losses over gains, is treated as an ordinary loss. In the former case, all the gains
and losses are treated as capital gains and losses; in the latter case, they are all treated
as ordinary gains and losses. If there are no gains, but only losses, they are all treated
as ordinary losses."
13. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c) (3).
14. See note 1 supra for text of this Code section.
15. MERvrEs, op. cit. s-upra note 5, § 165:2, at 178 (1965): "Included in the
deductions allowed in computing taxable income are losses actually sustained by the
taxpayer during the taxable year and not made good by insurance or some other form
of compensation. . . . § 165(c):2: The amount of the deduction for a casualty loss
is the lesser of the following: (a) the difference between the fair market value of
the property immediately before and after the casualty. (b) The adjusted basis
of the property for determining loss." Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939).
16. See note 3 supra for text of this regulation.
17. Fed. Tax Reg. (Regulations under I.R.C. 1939) § 39.117(g)(1)(a)(2), U. S.
CODE CONG. & ADM. Nmvs, 854-55 (1956).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1231-1(e) (1965). (Emphasis added.)
19. INTr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.
20. Maurer v. United States, supra note 6 (Commissioner's argument rejected);
Killebrew v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Tenn. 1964) (Commissioner's
argument rejected); Hall v. United States, 64-2 USTC Decision 9770 (E.D. Tenn.
1964) (Commissioner's argument rejected); Oppenheimer v. United States, 220 F.
Supp. 194 (W.D. Mo. 1963) (Commissioner's argument rejected); E. Taylor Chewn-
ing, 44 T.C. 678 (1965) (Commissioner's argument sustained). Since Killebrew
and Hall, supra, are now pending appeal in the Sixth Circuit, it is most likely that
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become law by virtue of the "re-enactment doctrine."21 The Commis-
sioner's position is supported by a consideration of the 1958 amend-
ment to section 123122 which clearly excludes from the coverage of
section 1231 any uninsured casualty loss incurred by the taxpayer
where such loss involved property used in the trade or business or
involved a capital asset held for more than six months and held for
the production of income. The 1958 amendment does not exclude
from the coverage of section 1231 a loss from a capital asset held for
more than six months and not held for the production of income, i.e.,
a loss to the taxpayer's personal residence. The Commissioner argued
that in passing the amendment Congress admitted that uncompensated
losses not involving conversion into other "property or money" were
within the scope of section 1231.23 In the leading case of Maurer v.
they will be reversed and brought in line with the Sixth Circuit determination in the
instant case.
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(e) has been in existence ever since the enactment of
§ 1231 (formerly 117(j) of INT. REV. CODE OF 1939). Fed. Tax Reg., U. S. CoDE
CoNG. & ADm. NE-ws (Regulations under I.R.C. 1939) 854-55 (1956). The Com-
missioner takes the position that because this Code section has subsequently been
reenacted several times since its inception in 1939, it now has the force And effect of
law. Helvering v. Windmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938) explains the effect of the
re-enactment doctrine: "Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without
substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes are
deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect of law." See
Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 291-92 (1945). Of course, the re-enactment
doctrine has no effect where the law is plain and needs no interpretation. Oberwinder
v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 255, 258 (8th Cir. 1945): "An administrative con-
struction of an unambiguous statute is not controlling on the courts. . . . 'Where
the law is plain the subsequent re-enactment of a statute does not constitute
adoption of its administrative construction."' 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcoME TAXA-
nor § 3.23, at 48-49 (Zimet, Stanley & Kilcullen rev. 1962): "The doctrine has
no application where the law itself is plain and needs no administrative construc-
tion ...... Since the Code section 1231 appears to be clear and unambiguous, in
that it requires a conversion into "other property or money," it is hard to see how
the Commissioner can contend that the Regulation [§ 1.1231-1(e)], which says
there need not be conversion into other property or money, has become law by the
re-enactment doctrine alone.
22. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1606, 1642 (1959), 26 U.S.C.
1231 (1964): "In the case of any property used in the trade or business and of any
capital asset held for more than 6 months and held for the production of income, this
subsection shall not apply to any loss, in respect to which the taxpayer is not compen-
sated for by insurance in any amount, arising from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other
casualty, or from theft."'
23. This view is supported by the legislative history of the Technical Amendments
Act of 1958, S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEvs
4791, 4992: "Under section 1231, uninsured casualty losses on depreciable property
or real estate used in the trade or business or on capital assets must be aggregated
with various other types of section 1231 gains and losses." The viewpoint of the
Commissioner that uninsured losses on a capital asset held for six months and not
held for the production of income (as a loss on a personal residence) are still
within scope of Section 1231 is also supported by this committee report: "On the
other hand, the amendment does not apply to a loss arising from the destruction or
theft of the taxpayer's uninsured personal automobile." Id. at 4992. The amendment
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United States,24 the Tenth Circuit held that an uninsured casualty loss
to a personal residence, which had not been converted into other
property or money, was exclusively covered by section 165(c) (3)
and should not go into the section 1231 "hotchpot."25 The basis of
the decision was that section 1231 only applied to involuntary con-
versions involving a conversion into other "property or money."2
After the decision in Maurer, the Commissioner issued his non-
acquiescence 7 but did not seek review by the Supreme Court.2
In the instant case, the court accepted the government's contention
that a loss from an uninsured capital asset held for more than six
months (taxpayer's trees and shrubbery) must be brought within
section 1231.29 Noting that the regulation interpreting section 1231
had been in existence since the 1939 Code and the code section had
been re-enacted without any disaffirmance of the regulation, the court
was designed to exclude from operation of section 1231 certain uninsured losses
arising from a business nature. Congress wanted to give those taxpayers who had
to carry their own insurance the benefit of ordinary loss deduction when they
sustained a loss. Ibid. From a reading of this amendments legislative history, it
appears that Congress thought uninsured losses were within the scope of § 1231.
24. 284 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1960).
25. This term is borrowed from Brrrics, op. cit. supra note 6, at 552 (3d ed. 1964).
It simply means a combining of all the section 1231 transactions for purpose of
determining overall gains and losses.
26. Maurer v. United States, supra note 6, at 124: "Section 1231 is aimed at
involuntary conversion where 'other property or money' is received in return, i.e.,
compensated losses, leaving Section 165 applicable to uncompensated losses ...
If, however, the casualty is uncompensated, it seems to follow that he should be
allowed an ordinary deduction. This is made clear when it is seen that Section 1231
is contextually similar to the sections dealing with capital gains and losses. Thus a
compensated loss is a taxable event closely akin to a 'sale or exchange' albeit an
involuntary one. Where, however, the taxpayer receives nothing in return, the
factual situation is entirely different and there is no rational basis for capital loss
treatment. If he can prove that the loss qualifies as a 'casualty,' it is only logical
to conclude that Congress intended that there be an ordinary deduction under
Section 165. .. ."
27. Rev. Rul. 61-54, 1961-1 CtGr. BuLL. 398-99.
28. In another case rejecting the Commissioner's argument, Killebrew v. United
States, supra note 20, appeal pending to 6th Cir., the court specifically discussed
both the 1958 amendment to § 1231 and the congressional committee's explanation
of the amendment. Relying on the overall purpose and the clear language of the
statute, the court found that an involuntary conversion only resulted when there
was a conversion into other "property or money." The court said: "If this con-
gressional committee language were the only matter to be considered, the govern-
ment's case would be plausible. However, as indicated in the Maurer case, there is
considerably more legislative history behind the two statutes involved than is indi-
cated in the brief comments on this section appearing in the long committee report
cited. Furthermore to accept the construction of the language actually enacted by the
government might well raise serious questions as to congressional power to make the
distinction urged. Certainly when the most reasonable ruling of the language Congress
actually chose to enact into law avoids a constitutional question, it would be folly
for courts to look outside the statute for evidence in indicating a different intent that
might pose such a question." Id. at 483-84.
29. 355 F.2d at 221.
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found that the regulation had acquired the force of law.30 In addition,
the court adopted the Commissioner's interpretation of the 1958
amendment to section 1231 and its legislative history.31 Although
recognizing the apparent split of authority32 and admitting the close-
ness of the question, the court held that the casualty loss to the
taxpayer's residence was to be brought within section 1231 even
though there was no conversion into other "property or money."
33
The congressional intent in the original enactment of section 1231
indicates that an involuntary conversion results when either property
or money is returned, i.e., proceeds from insurance or otherwise.34
Although the regulation5 does state that there need not be a con-
version into other property or money, this does not mean the regulation
controls. In order for a regulation to be effective, it must be consistent
with the statute.Y6 If the unambiguous law is later re-enacted with a
contrary regulation still in existence, the regulation does not gain the
force and effect of law.37 Prior to the 1958 amendment to section
1231,- the language of the statute clearly required a conversion
into other "property or money." 9 When the 1958 amendment to
section 1231 is considered,40 however, the court's argument that the
regulation has gained the approval of congress seems quite con-
vincing. The amendment and its legislative history4' clearly indi-
cate that Congress thought certain uninsured losses, that is, losses
where there is no conversion into other "property or money," weie
already within the purview of the section. In fact, the example
given by the Senate Finance Committee 2 in discussing the effect
of the 1958 amendment shows that Congress did not intend to
exclude from section 1231 uninsured losses of capital assets held
30. See note 17 supra.
31. See notes 22 and 23 supra and accompanying text.
32. See note 20 supra for cases accepting and rejecting the Commissioner's argument.
33. 355 F.2d at 221.
34. 14 VxD. L. REV. 1538, 1539 (1961).
35. Treas. Reg. § 1231-1(e) (1965).
36. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936): "A
regulation which does not do this, but operates to create a rule out of harmony with
the statute, is a mere nullity. . . . And not only must a regulation, in order to be
valid, be consistent with the statute, but it must be reasonable."
37. See Oberwinder v. Commissioner, supra note 21.
38. See note 22 supra for text of amendment.
39. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231(a): "If, during the taxable year, the
recognized gains on sales and exchanges of property . .. plus the recognized gains from
the compulsory or involuntary conversions of property used in trade or business and
capital assets held for more than six months into other property or money. ...
(Emphasis added.)"
40. See note 22 supra for text of amendment.




for more than six months. In Maurer v. United States,43 the court
noted that section 1231 was contextually similar to the other sections
dealing with capital gains and losses.4 Reasoning that a compen-
sated loss was like a "sale or exchange," although an involuntary
one, that court determined section 1231 applied only if property
or money was received in exchange. When there was an uncompen-
sated loss, the court reasoned that section 165 logically applied.5
Since a 1954 loss was involved in Maurer, however, the court did
not discuss the effect of the 1958 amendment.46 The Maurer decision
may be inapplicable for post 1958 transactions since the 1958 amend-
ment and its legislative history appear to support the instant court's
view. It seems apparent that the confusion in the area stems from
the fact that the statute is ambiguous. The 1958 amendment and the
language requiring a conversion into other "property or money" are
in apparent conflict. In passing the 1958 amendment, Congress had
a reason for excluding from the operation of section 1231 uninsured
property used in the trade or business and capital assets held for the
production of income for more than six months. The insured business-
man could deduct as a business expense the insurance premiums he
paid to insure his business property, but the businessman who was
unable to obtain insurance could not deduct the reserve he carried
in lieu of insurance. In order to equalize this situation, Congress
decided to give the business casualty losses of the latter the favorable
ordinary loss treatment. There was, however, no equally compelling
reason to exclude from the operation of section 1231 uninsured
nonbusiness casualty losses. 47 This congressional history indicates
Congress thought certain uninsured losses were within the scope of
section 1231, for otherwise there would have been no need to
enact the 1958 amendment, excluding the business uninsurea losses.
The ambiguity presently inherent in section 1231 could most easily
be eliminated by amending the section to provide expressly that a
conversion need not be into other "property or money."
43. 284 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1960).
44. Id. at 124. See note 26 supra.
45. Ibid.
46. See note 22 supra for text of amendment.
47. Technical Amendments Act, S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADm. Nmvs 4791, 4992. 23 J. TAxATIoN 213 (Oct. 1965).
[ VOL. 19
RECENT CASES
Torts-Issuance of Tickets at Plane's Boarding
Ramp Not Sufficient Delivery To Qualify for
Liability Limitation Under Warsaw Convention
Plaintiffs, as administrators, brought a wrongful death action in the
federal district court to recover damages resulting from an airplane
crash on an international flight. Decedents were military personnel
flying to Vietnam aboard defendant's aircraft, which had been
chartered by the United States Air Force. They were given their
plane tickets at the foot of the boarding ramp, each ticket containing
notice that the carrier's liability was limited in accordance with the
Warsaw Convention.1 The aircraft disappeared en route. The district
court determined that the 8300 dollars liability limit per person,
established by the Convention, was applicable.2 Plaintiffs appealed,
maintaining that there had not been adequate delivery of the tickets
for the Convention limitation to be invoked.3 On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held, reversed.
Where a ticket is not delivered in sufficient time to afford the pas-
senger an opportunity to take self-protective measures, there is not
adequate delivery as required by the Warsaw Convention. Warren
v. Flying Tiger Air Lines, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
In 1934, the United States signed the Warsaw Convention, which
limits liability of air carriers to approximately 8300 dollars per pas-
senger for injury or death on international flights except where willful
negligence can be proved.4 In exchange for this limitation of liability
the Convention granted the passenger (1) a rebuttable presumption
of the carrier's negligence5 and (2) a choice of four possible forums
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air [Hereinafter cited as the Warsaw Convention], adherence advised
by United States Senate on June 15, 1934; adherence declared on June 27, 1934;
proclaimed October 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, 3013, 3015, 3019, 3020, 3021, 3025,
T.S. No. 876.
2. Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 223 (N.D. Calif. 1965).
3. Warsaw Convention, art. 3(2), 49 Stat. 3015, provides: "Nevertheless, if the
carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall
not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude
or limit his liability."
4. Warsaw Convention, art. 22(1), 49 Stat. 3019, states: "In the carriage of pas-
sengers the liability of the carrier toward each passenger is limited to the sum of
125,000 francs."
5. Warsaw Convention, arts. 17, 20, & 21 provide: art. 17, "The carrier is liable
for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any
other bodily injury suffered by a-passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking." Article 20, "The carrier is not liable if he proves that
he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that
it was impossible for him and them to take such measures." Article 21 provides the
carrier the defense of contributory negligence.
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in which to bring his action. 6 The burden was thus shifted to the
carrier to disprove its negligence. Consequently the passenger no
longer had to show the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in those
states where such a doctrine was available; in jurisdictions where,
prior to the Convention, res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to
aviation accidents the passenger was given the presumption of
negligence.7 At the same time, the choice of forum provision usually
made a remedy available at minimum expense. Also, the 8300 dollars
liability limit benefited passengers in many jurisdictions where national
limits on liability would have been substantially lower.8 By this
balancing of interests of passengers, air carriers, and other nations, it
was hoped that a degree of uniformity could be achieved in inter-
national air law, that the risk of loss could be more equitably ap-
portioned, and that excessive judgments which would thwart the
growth of the then infant air transport industry could be avoided.9
In the United States, largely because of the high standard of
living, the limitation of liability to 8300 dollars has spawned a
movement either to raise substantially the limit or to withdraw from
6. Warsaw Convention, art. 28(1), 49 Stat. 3020. "An action for damages must
be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, either before the court having jurisdiction where the carrier has
his domicile or has its principal place of business, or has an establishment by which
the contract has been made, or before the court having jurisdiction at the place of
destination."
7. In 1934, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not widely available. Since that
time it has become accepted in practically all common law jurisdictions. However, there
has been a lack of uniformity in the amount of evidence required to make the doctrine
applicable and in the determination of the effect of the doctrine. In aviation cases
it has been said that reliance on res ipsa loquitur is an extremely uncertain route
to recovery where the case is to go to a jury. (One study revealed that where there
was reliance upon res ipsa, 22 out of 24 verdicts were returned for defendants.)
see McLarty, Res Ispa Loquitur in Aviation Passenger Litigation, 37 VA. L. Raw. 55
(1957); Sand, Limitation of Liability and Passenger's Accident Compensation Under the
Warsaw Convention, 11 Am. J. Coap. L. 21, 33 n.16 (1962).
8. This reason has been advanced as a rationale for continued adherence to the
Convention. However, it has also been stated that there might be many exceptions
to national limitations, or that foreign courts applying the law of a forum might
refuse to accept these national limits as part of the applicable law. See Lissitzyn,
The Warsaw Convention Today, 56TH ANN. Paoc. Am. Soc. oF INT. LAW, 115, 118
(1962).
9. Several other rationales for the limitation of liability have been suggested. These
are collected and discussed in DRsoN, LinrrAToN OF LuBILITY IN INTERNATONAL Am
LAw 12-43 (1954). They include the following: (a) analogy to maritime law with
its global limitation of the shipowner's liability; (b) protection of a financially weak
industry; (c) catastrophical risks should not be borne by aviation alone; (d) neces-
sity of carriers or operators being able to insure against these risks; (e) possibility
for the potential claimants to take insurance themselves; (f) limitation of liability
as a counterpart to the aggravated system of liability imposed upon the carrier
and operator (quid pro quo); (g) avoidance of litigation by facilitation of quick
settlements; (h) unification of the law with respect to the amount of damages to be
paid. DRioN, op. cit. supra at 12-13.
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the Convention.' It is argued that this limit is unfair to the passenger
since the airline industry is now well-developed and can avoid
irreparable injury from large judgments through proper insurance.
Indeed, as a result of pressure from this country, the Warsaw signa-
tories met at the Hague in 1955 where an amendment was proposed
which would have doubled the liability limit." However, the Hague
Protocol also proposed that the standard of proof of wilful negligence
be raised, making it more difficult to avoid the limitation of liability. 12
The United States, still displeased with these limits and conditions,
has now served notice of its intent to withdraw from the Convention,
effective May 15, 1966.13 However, some writers maintain that the
advantages granted in the presumption of negligence and choice of
forum provisions outweigh the disadvantage of the low liability limit,
especially since the passenger can readily avoid the harsh impact of
this limit by obtaining flight insurance at any airport. 14
It is in the context of dissatisfaction with the low liability limit
that American courts have defined "delivery" for purposes of the
Convention. The Convention provides that in order for the carrier
to avail itself of the liability limit, it must not "accept a passenger
without a passenger ticket having been delivered."15 The ticket must
contain a statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
10. Lissitzyn, supra note 8, at 115; Calkins, Hiking the Limits of Liability at the
HAGUE, 56TH ANN. PRoc. Am. Soc. INT. LAw 120-21 (1962).
11. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air [hereinafter cited as the Hague Protocol],
concluded at the Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, International Civil Aviation Organization,
Doc. 7632, 2 Av. L. REP. 27,101, 27,104. The United States has not ratified the
Protocol, and is not expected to. For comments on the Protocol and its history, see
Calkins, supra note 10; Forrest, Carriage by Air: The Hague Protocol, 10 INT'L &
Comp. L.Q. 726 (1961).
12. At present the Warsaw Convention, art. 25(1), reads as follows: "The carrier
shall not be entitled to . . . limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his
wilful misconduct (literally: his intentional misconduct or such fault on his part
as . . . is considered to be equivalent to intentional misconduct)." The Hague
Protocol would change this to read: "The limits of liability specified in Article 22
shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of
the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly
and with knowledge that damage would probably result ...... " Thus, the
Protocol would impose a more definite and higher standard of proof on the plaintiff
in order to avoid the limited liability.
13. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1965, p. 94. For a recent article discussing and approving
this action see Kreindler, Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 1. Am L. &
Com. 291 (1965).
14. Sand, supra note 7. Cf. DmoN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 42, where he states
that the only sound rationales for the limitation of liability in case of injury or death
of a passenger are (1) "the better position of the passenger in insuring risk of his
death or injury in excess of the average passenger accident risk, and (2) reduction
of litigation by offering an easy basis for settlement."
15. Warsaw Convention, art. 3(2), 49 Stat. 3015.
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relating to liability established by the Convention.16 Ross v. Pan
American World Airways,'7 one of the two cases dealing with de-
livery, held that the ticket was delivered when given either to a
person with implied authority to act for the passenger, or to one whose
acts are ratified by the passenger's boarding the plane after seeing
the ticket.18 Thus the court employed an agency principle to resolve
the issue of delivery. In Mertens v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 9 the
court adopted a functional approach by requiring as a prerequisite
for valid delivery that the passenger have an opportunity to take
self-protective measures once he has seen his ticket advising him of
the limited liability.20 The court reasoned that by use of the
word "accepted" in the Convention, the signors intended to set
such limits on "delivery" as would afford the passenger an oppor-
tunity to secure self protection after he had read the ticket. Other-
wise, delivery would be meaningless.
In the instant case the court followed the Mertens decision. The
function of the delivery requirement is to apprise passengers of the
carrier's limited liability so that they may take self-protective
measures. The court found that the tickets were delivered too late
for this function to be fulfilled and thus the carrier had accepted a
passenger to whom a ticket had not been effectively delivered.
2 '
By the terms of the Convention, then, the carrier was not entitled
to limited liability.'2
A lack of any clear manifestation of intent by the framers23 has
permitted the court, in this case, to place its own construction on the
word "delivery"-a construction which clearly reflects the national
animosity toward the low limitation upon liability. Similar construc-
16. Warsaw Convention, art. 3(1)(e), 49 Stat. 3015, states: "For the transportation
of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket which shall contain the
following: . . . (e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by this convention."
17. 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949).
18. 63 H.nv. L. 1.Ev. 692 (1949).
19. 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
20. Id. at 857.
21. A tinge of sympathy may be felt for the defendant air carrier at this point.
In the litigation of the Mertens case, the defendants bad learned that delivery in
the air was probably not sufficient, and had carefully instructed their employees to let
no one aboard the aircraft without first giving them a boarding ticket.
22. Warsaw Convention, art. 3(2), 49 Stat. 3015.
23.The problem of whether delivery is to contain some element of notice is in-
herent in the language of art. 3 of the Convention. Art. 3 (2) provides: "The
absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect the existence or
the validity of the contract of transportation, which shall none the less be subject
to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without
a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself




tions by courts of all the Convention signatories would lead to con-
fusion in an area where uniformity was an express goal.2 Further-
more, it seems that a case by case interpretation of the Convention's
terms to fit American notions of fairness is clearly an undesirable
approach2s To the American plaintiff the Convention has lost many
of the advantages which recommended it in 1934. Both the choice
of forum provisions and the presumption of the carrier's negligence
have become less important with the development of the law. It is
now likely that most plaintiffs would be entitled to an American
forum under the "minimal contacts" tests of International Shoe.2
Also, the fact that res ipsa loquitur has now been accepted in all
common law jurisdictions lessens the value of the Convention to
American plaintiffs. The Convention's limit on liability may also be
criticized on the basic ground that such uniformity in the amount
of damages is not desirable because of diverse standards of living
among the nations. For example, compensatory damages for the
loss of life of the average American school teacher would be very
different from compensatory damages for the loss of life of the
average Indian school teacher. This difference arises solely from the
standard of living and social values of the two countries. However,
it still appears that uniformity in the standard of care and ticketing
procedures is a desirable goal in international travel, and that the
only real objection to the Convention is the low liability limit.27
Since this problem could be alleviated in a large number of cases by
enactment of implementing legislation requiring compulsory flight
insurance for American air carriers on international flights, it is hoped
that the United States might reconsider its withdrawal from the
Convention.8
24. Though uniformity may be desired in procedures of claimants and in the de-
termination of liability of the carrier, it has been submitted that uniformity in the
amount of damages may not be desirable because of the diverse economic and
social characteristics of the different nations. DmRoN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 42.
25. Such an approach does nothing to ameliorate other equally "hard cases" where
all the technical requirements of the Convention have been met. Surely, the average
passenger does not read the fine print on his ticket and then either purchase insurance
or refuse to fly.
26. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1943); Berner v.
United Airlines, Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 9, 157 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1st Dep't 1956), aff'd,
2 N.Y.2d 1003, 147 N.E.2d 732, 170 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1957); Goodman v. Pan
American World Airways, 1 Misc. 2d 959, 148 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 2 App.
Div. 2d 707, 153 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 2 App. Div. 2d 781, 154
N.Y.S.2d 839 (2d Dep't 1956).
27. It should be noted that although the limit might be raised to a level consonant
with the standard of living in the United States, this would not mean that all re-
coveries would automatically be the upper limit. Rather it would remain the function
of the court to determine actual damages and deserved compensation in each case.
The airlines, however, argue that any set limit tends to become the standard recovery
and thus oppose the substantial raising of the limit. Kreindler, supra note 13, at 292.
28. For expansion and delineation of this idea see Sand, supra note 7.
